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I. INTRODUCTION

It was March 2007, and in the Mediterranean resort of Monte
Carlo, Matt King was making dire predictions about a collapse of the
U.S. subprime housing market-a subject that must have seemed as
inconsequential as it was foreign to most of this casino town's wellheeled visitors. But for Mr. King, head of quantitative credit strategy
for Citigroup, the ramifications of rising subprime foreclosure rates
were anything but inconsequential. Speaking at Citigroup's annual
credit conference, King emphasized how subprime credit had been
repackaged into securities such as collateralized debt obligations
("CDOs"), which now sat in large quantities on banks' balance sheets.1
Noting that a "significant proportion of the [asset-backed securities]
which has gone into CDOs . . . has been of the subprime variety,"2 he

warned that subprime losses had already forced several large banks to
set aside additional funds to cover subprime losses. These losses, in
turn, made him "deeply suspicious" of banks "with exposures in that
space who have not declared anything like the same degree of
3

provisioning."
As it turned out, it was King's own employer, Citigroup, that
ultimately proved especially vulnerable to these concerns. Following
weeks of speculation that Citigroup was heavily exposed to subprime
credit, the bank finally revealed on November 4, 2007, the size of its
subprime-linked CDO portfolio: the third-quarter loss of between $8
billion and $10 billion it announced that day stemmed from a
significant write-down in its direct holdings of $43 billion of CDOs. 4
For many, the revelation led to an immediate reassessment of the
firm, with all three credit rating agencies downgrading the bank or

1.
Carrick Mollenkamp, Subprime Surprise for Europeans, WALL ST. J. (EUROPE), Mar. 9,
2007, at 17.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4.
Citi's Sub-Prime Related Exposure in Securities and Banking, Bus. WIRE, Nov. 4, 2007,
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20071104005056/en/Citis-Sub-Prime-RelatedExposure -Securities-Banking.
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placing it on negative watch. 5 Of potentially greater concern, however,
was the considerable uncertainty that remained about the bank's true
subprime exposure. Recognizing that Citigroup had only disclosed its
direct, unhedged CDO exposure, analysts on the next day's earnings
call repeatedly asked for information regarding the amount of
6
additional, undisclosed exposures hedged with monoline insurers.
Gary Crittenden, Citigroup's chief financial officer, acknowledged the
importance of the issue, but could only provide a simple, "No, we
7
haven't disclosed it."
Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008
("Financial Crisis"), making financial institutions more transparent to
the marketplace has become a central reform objective for both
commentators and regulators alike.8 Informed largely by the failure of
5.
Moody's, Fitch Downgrade Citigroup, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 5, 2007,
http://www.abcmoney.co.uk/news/052007158725.htm; see also Yves Smith, How Messed Up Is
Citi?, NAKED CAPITALISM, Nov. 5, 2007, http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2007/11/how-messedup-is-citi.html (expressing surprise upon learning that, compared to Merrill Lynch, "Citi had
bigger exposures and yet has done nothing to reduce its positions. This is unforgivable, and it
will have consequences.").
6.
Guy Moszkowski of Merrill Lynch was especially interested in obtaining additional
information regarding its hedged CDO positions. See Citigroup Inc. to Discuss Recent
Announcements-Conference Call, FD WIRE, Nov. 5, 2007, http://seekingalpha.com/article/53200citigroup-risk-managers ("Maybe you can comment for us ... on the dependence in any of the
vehicles . . . on guarantees . . . from the monoline insurers like MBIA or Ambac that have

obviously had some pretty significant credit spread blowouts? .. . And again, you can't sort of
give us a sense for how much that might be?").
7.
Id.
8.
See, e.g., FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FASB STAFF POSITION NO. 133-1 AND
F11445-4, DISCLOSURES ABOUT CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND CERTAIN GUARANTEES: AN
AMENDMENT OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 133 AND FASB INTERPRETATION No. 45; AND
CLARIFICATION OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF FASB STATEMENT NO. 161 (2008), available at
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Page/
nr091208.shtml
(requiring
enhanced
disclosure
requirements for sellers of credit derivatives and financial guarantees); SQUAM LAKE WORKING
GRP. ON FIN. REGULATION, A NEW INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 1-5
(2009) (proposing a new information infrastructure to manage systemic risk in which large
financial institutions provide government regulators with the identity of individual positions
that would then be released to the public), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication/
18568/newinformationinfrastructureforfinancialmarkets.html; Margaret M. Blair & Erik F.
Gerding, Sometimes Too Great a Notional: Measuring the "Systemic Significance" of OTC Credit
Derivatives, LOMBARD STREET, Aug. 2009, at 10, 11 (proposing that the "Federal Reserve (or
other systemic risk regulator) . . . require that financial institutions publicly disclose detailed
information on the size, counterparties, and closing dates of credit derivatives in their portfolios
on a regular and frequent basis, such as at the close of business each business day"); Michael
Simkovic, Secret Liens and the FinancialCrisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 289-95 (2009)
(arguing that Congress should enhance the transparency of financial institutions' true leverage
by establishing a mandatory, universal recordation system for any instrument that substantively
creates a secured liability for an institution, including liabilities arising from derivatives and
asset securitizations).
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banks' internal risk departments to manage risk, the general intuition
is that by reducing the opacity of financial institutions, market
participants such as Matt King might more effectively monitor and
price the risks embedded in particular institutions. Thus, sections
115(f) and 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act 9 ("Dodd-Frank") grant the newly created
Financial Stability Oversight Council ("FSOC") as well as the Federal
Reserve Board ("FRB") broad authority to require additional, periodic
public disclosures of banks and nonbank financial companies to
"support market evaluation of the risk profile, capital adequacy, and
risk management capabilities thereof."10 Internationally, too, a similar
proposal 1 to enhance market discipline of international banks has
been suggested for the Basel Accords of the Basel Committee on
12
Banking Supervision.
But exactly how should one go about making banks more
transparent? Both Dodd-Frank and the Basel proposal provide
surprisingly little guidance. At the same time, the Citigroup
experience above suggests market participants such as Mr. King, left
with only his suspicions, may indeed lack the information necessary to
engage in effective market discipline, leaving oversight of banks
entirely in the hands of their prudential regulators. Yet the nowinfamous ineffectiveness of regulators in understanding the risks
embedded in financial firms prior to 2008-such as the Office of Thrift
Supervision's failed monitoring of AIG Financial Products and

9.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
727, 763, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
10. Id. §§ 115(f), 165(d) (authorizing FSOC and the FRB). The enhanced disclosures would
apply to 'large, interconnected bank holding companies" as well as any nonbank financial
companies supervised by the FRB. Id. § 165(d).
11. On March 25, 2009, the European Commission published a staff working document on
possible amendments to the Basel II Capital Accords to enhance market discipline of banking
institutions. EUROPEAN COMM'N, COMMISSION SERVICES STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT: POSSIBLE

CHANGES TO THE CRD 1-10 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eulinternalmarketfbank/docs/
regcapitallconsutbesec-en.pdf.
12. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of bank supervisory
authorities that was established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten
countries in an effort to promote international harmonization of banking regulations. The
committee comprises senior representatives of bank supervisory authorities and central banks
from Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Press Release, Bank for Int'l
Settlements, Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework 16 (June 3, 1999),
available at http://www.bis.org/press/p990603.htm. Although not binding on any individual
nation, the Basel Accords represent the committee's framework for regulating capital adequacy
among international banks. Id.
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Washington Mutual' 3-- only underscores the need to move beyond
mere talk of greater transparency and to think concretely about a
conceptual basis for implementing it. The argument advanced here is
that, somewhat surprisingly, the very credit risk modeling techniques
that failed so spectacularly during the Financial Crisis may provide
part of the answer.
To see why, it is important to emphasize that in advocating for
greater market discipline of financial institutions, Dodd-Frank was
hardly writing on a blank slate. The idea that market discipline might
be used to supplement regulatory oversight of financial institutions
has been a long-standing policy both in the United States and
abroad. 4 Indeed, from a disclosure perspective, one of the more
difficult aspects of the Financial Crisis was that the very institutions
whose subprime exposures were so opaque were the same institutions
producing enormous quantities of mandatory disclosures. For publicly
traded firms such as Citigroup, these disclosures included the periodic
reporting obligations imposed by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,15 as well as quarterly and annual banking reports required to be
filed by all banks and bank-holding companies. 16 Additionally,
international banks, subject to the Basel Accord, were required to
make quarterly and annual public disclosures pursuant to the
Accord's "Pillar 3" Market Discipline provisions. 17 In the case of

13. See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of
Deregulationand Regulatory Failure,41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1357-61 (2009) (summarizing OTS
regulatory failures).
14. See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, ENHANCING BANK TRANSPARENCY:
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AND SUPERVISORY INFORMATION THAT PROMOTE SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS IN

BANKING SYSTEMS (1998), available at http://www.bis.orgtpublbcbscl41.pdf (arguing that
market discipline and public disclosure promote a more stable banking system); see also GRP. OF
THIRTY,

ENHANCING

PUBLIC CONFIDENCE

IN FINANCIAL

REPORTING

(2003), available at

www.enhyper.com/content/G30_2003_EPCFR.pdf (arguing the same).
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a), 78n(d) (2006).
16. See 12 U.S.C. § 161 (2006) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 324 (state member banks); 12
U.S.C. § 1817(a) (state nonmember banks). In particular, banks must publicly file each quarter a
Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (or Call Report), while bank holding companies
must file each quarter a Form Y-9C. The Form Y-9C requires substantially the same information
as a Call Report. FR Y-9C: ConsolidatedFinancialStatements for Bank Holding Companies, BD.
OF GOVERNORS

OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS.,

Sept. 29, 2011,

http://www.federalreserve.gov

/reportforms[ReportDetail.cfm?WhichFormId=FRY-9C.
17. Following the development of an original set of capital requirements in 1988, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision developed a more robust system for regulating capital
adequacy in the late 1990s, commonly referred to as "Basel 2." Under Basel 2, capital adequacy
is assessed using three distinct "pillars": Pillar 1 prescribes the minimum capital requirements
for banks, Pillar 2 addresses the associated supervisory review process, and Pillar 3 requires
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Citigroup's 2008 financial results, for instance, the end result was an
18
impressive 395 pages of disclosures, excluding exhibits.
The problem with prevailing bank disclosures, however, is that
they are generally limited to aggregated metrics that make it difficult
to assess a bank's credit concentrations, underwriting standards, or
portfolio quality. 19 Two main factors impede the publication of the
type of granular, position-level data demanded by Citigroup's analysts
above. The first factor is banks' concern with protecting the
confidentiality of the bank-customer relationship as well as a bank's
proprietary investment strategies. 20 Both could be jeopardized by more
certain public disclosure to facilitate market discipline. See JOHN C. HULL, RISK MANAGEMENT
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 231-32 (2010).
18. See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2009), available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/datalar08cen.pdf (242 pages); CITIBANK, N.A., CALL REPORT
(2008), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/callO81231cb.pdf?ieNocache=381
(60
pages); Citigroup, Inc.,
Form Y-9C (2008), available at http://www.citigroup.coml
citilfin/data/y9cO8l231c.pdf?ieNocache=381
(44 pages); CITIBANK EUROPE PLC, PILLAR 3
DISCLOSURES (2008), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/b2p3d081231b.pdf?
ieNocache=176 (26 pages); CITI UK FSA REGULATED LEGAL VEHICLES, PILLAR 3 DISCLOSURES
(2008), available at http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/datafb2p3dO8l231.pdf?ieNocache=619 (49
pages).
19. For instance, while all SEC-reporting entities must file financial statements as part of
their periodic reports, firms' reporting obligations under U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP") typically require only aggregate disclosures of their fixed income
investments. See, e.g., ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN INVESTMENTS IN DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 115, § 19 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1993)
[hereinafter SFAS], available at www.fasb.org/pdf/fasll5.pdf (requiring all reporting entities to
"disclose the aggregate fair value" for securities classified as available for sale); see also ERNST &
YOUNG LLP, FINANCIAL REPORTING DEVELOPMENTS: ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN INVESTMENTS IN
DEBT AND EQUITY SECURITIES (2009) (summarizing disclosure obligations with respect to
securities that are available for sale and held to maturity). Moreover, attempts to argue that a
firm's financial statements are materially misleading in the absence of more granular portfolio
disclosures have generally failed in court. See, e.g., In re N.Y. Cmty. Bancorp, Inc. Sec. Litig., 448
F. Supp. 2d 466, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that additional disclosure is not required where
"it is apparent from the quarterly reports disclosed to the public that the company was heavily
involved in investing in mortgage-backed securities").
20. See, e.g., GRP. OF THIRTY, supra note 14, at 21 (expressing concern that enhanced
disclosures could have the "de facto effect of compromising proprietary information of individual
firms in ways that undercut the competitive edge of the most innovative and creative
institutions"). More generally, Merritt Fox has suggested that a firm might disclose to investors
a suboptimal amount of proprietary information concerning its operations on account of the fact
that the disclosing firm will be unable to capture the significant value these disclosures provide
to competitors. Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is
Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1339 (1999). This is especially true where
disclosing proprietary information would cause the disclosing firm to suffer a competitive
disadvantage. Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on
Public Companies, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 123, 147 (2004). Each of these concerns may be
particularly acute in the context of financial firms' investment holdings where release of trading
strategies could greatly benefit other firms at the same time that they might harm the disclosing
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detailed disclosures of a bank's investment positions and loans-a
concern that has largely been echoed in a federal banking policy that
21
exempts such position-level data from mandatory public reporting.
The second factor relates to the complexity of a bank's investment
activities. Of course, ex post, when individual borrowers, market
sectors, or entire countries suffer distress-as in the case of Enron's
bankruptcy, the subprime market collapse, or Greece's fiscal crisismarket participants might easily identify the type of granular, specific
data they require to assess an institution's risk of loss. However, the
notion that banks should have ongoing obligations to disclose similarly
detailed information for the full multitude of firms, industries, and
regions to which they have credit exposure naturally raises the
question of whether the sheer costs involved in the enterprise would
be justified. This is particularly true for large commercial banks that
may have credit exposure not only from their traditional loan
portfolios, but also from their dealing and trading in securities and
22
over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives.
The central claim of this Article is that using the knowledge of
credit risk modeling to inform banks' disclosure obligations can
significantly enhance bank transparency while largely averting each

firm (for example, by allowing competitors to take an adverse trading position against the
disclosed position).
21. For instance, Title VII of Dodd-Frank, which governs "Wall Street Transparency and
Accountability," mandates the central clearing of swaps and imposes on swaps dealers a number
of record-keeping and reporting obligations. The statute, however, limits any public reporting to
"real-time public reporting" of swaps transactions, making clear that all such reports are to be
made "in a manner that does not disclose the business transactions and market positions of any
person." See Dodd-Frank Act § 727. This concern also motivated the initial refusal by the New
York Federal Reserve to disclose the names of the CDOs it acquired from AIG in 2008. See AIG
Discloses Details on Toxic Securities, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 29, 2010 (detailing the Federal
Reserve's fear that disclosure will make the resale of CDOs more difficult); see also GRP. OF
THIRTY, supra note 14, at 21 (expressing regulators' concern with revealing banks' proprietary
information). See generally infra notes 43-64 and accompanying text (discussing federal bank
disclosure policy).
22. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 347
(noting that increased use of derivatives trading by larger banks makes their operations more
complicated and opaque for regulators and investors). Evidence indicating that market
participants may be particularly slow to react to detailed, position-level data concerning an
institution's exposure to these more complex securities further diminishes the rationale for
requiring more detailed disclosures to facilitate market discipline. See generally Robert P.
Bartlett, III, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivatives Disclosures
During the FinancialCrisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1 (2010) (finding no notable market reaction in the
stock price of monoline insurers following significant downgrades in their disclosed CDO
positions).
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of these two issues. Notwithstanding the complex ways a bank can be
exposed to credit risk, the practical need for institutions to manage it
has nevertheless facilitated a rich literature on credit risk modeling
that offers insight into the type of disclosures that can enable more
effective market discipline. 23 In particular, by analyzing credit risk in
a bank's investment portfolio in terms of a limited, standard set of
quantifiable metrics, credit risk models provide an architecture for
analyzing a bank's overall exposure to credit risk that is both well
understood within the financial sector and parsimonious in the
information required to be processed. For the same reasons, disclosure
of these standard metrics provides a potentially simple but powerful
method for a financial institution to communicate useful information
concerning its exposure to credit risk without the need to disclose
proprietary position information. Yet to date, standard bank
24
disclosures generally omit mention of these parameter estimates,
thus missing an important opportunity to make banks more
transparent by using the very analytical tools banks themselves
developed to make credit risk less opaque.
To explore the ways in which credit risk models could better
inform bank disclosure policy, this Article undertakes a pair of case
studies examining two of the most severe banking crises in U.S.
history: the collapse of the Continental Illinois National Bank and
Trust Company ("CINB") in 1984 and the near collapse of Citigroup in
2008. In each instance, the bank's distress prompted either a
subsequent government investigation or private litigation that
provided sufficient details concerning the composition of each bank's
credit portfolio to estimate the core set of parameters needed for a
basic credit risk model of the bank's credit portfolio. As such, each
crisis provides a unique opportunity to explore how a "model sensitive"
disclosure regime might better enable market participants to detect a
bank's insolvency risk and assess its overall capital adequacy.
Although the problems afflicting each bank's credit portfolio
differed markedly, the analysis below illustrates how standard
approaches to credit portfolio modeling might have used disclosure of
these parameter estimates to detect each bank's insolvency risk well
in advance of its distress. At the same time, in neither case would the
23.

For accessible introductions to the topic, see JOHN B. CAOUETTE ET AL., MANAGING

CREDIT RISK (2d ed. 2008); ARNAUD DE SERVIGNY & OLIVIER RENAULT,
MANAGING CREDIT RISK (2004).

MEASURING AND

24. See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text (discussing current mandatory disclosure
requirements pertaining to a bank's exposure to credit risk).
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public disclosures have required the firm to reveal individual positionlevel data, suggesting the potential for greater market discipline
without the need to reveal proprietary trading information. Of course,
the fact that such parameter estimates are publicly available for so
few failing firms-and not at all available for nonfailing firms-makes
it impossible to assess the error rate of such an approach. Nor do we
know the precise credit models market participants would use were
such disclosures routinely provided. Yet by providing a detailed
thought experiment of how market participants might use such
disclosures with even basic, textbook credit models, the case studies
below provide good reason to believe that the same credit modeling
techniques long valued by bank managers to assess their portfolio's
credit risk might also be used by capital markets to understand better
a bank's overall capital position and insolvency risk. For similar
reasons, as bank regulators around the world consider how to revise
the disclosure obligations for systemically important financial
institutions, designing pilot disclosure programs that facilitate credit
modeling among market participants can provide more general data
concerning the conditions under which such modeling would be
conducted and the error rates associated with it.25
To be sure, credit risk modeling is hardly perfect. The
simplifying assumptions undergirding even the most sophisticated of
models necessarily make them subject to potentially significant
error-a risk made all the more acute if market participants seek to
utilize them with only limited knowledge of a bank's portfolio.

25. The use of a temporary pilot program (as opposed to a permanent regulatory rule) may
be especially appropriate where an administrative agency lacks the data or information with
which to fully evaluate a particular regulatory proposal. See, e.g., Short Sales, 68 Fed. Reg.
62,972 (proposed Nov. 6, 2003) (proposing a year-long mandatory pilot program in which the
"uptick" rule would be removed for trading in "specified liquid securities"); Community BankFocused Regulation Review: Lending Limits Pilot Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,292 (proposed Sept.
22, 2000) (proposing a three-year pilot program providing eligible national banks with the
authority to utilize larger lending limits for certain types of borrowers); Electronic Filing,
Processing and Information Dissemination System, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,707 (proposed Mar. 30, 1984)
(proposing a pilot program in which participating companies would file all periodic reports with
the SEC in an electronic format). In general, such pilot programs are entitled to ordinary
Chevron deference. See Tex. Sav. & Cmty. Bankers Ass'n v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Bd., 201 F.3d 551
(5th Cir. 2000) (approving pilot lending program authorized by the Federal Housing Finance
Board). As such, Dodd-Frank's broad grant of authority to the FRB to design enhanced public
disclosures for systemically important financial institutions would presumably be sufficient to
authorize the disclosures proposed in Part V on either a permanent or a pilot basis. See Pub. L.
No. 111-203, §165(d) (authorizing the FRB to promulgate enhanced disclosures that it
"determines are appropriate").
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Admonitions to be cautious in the use of models2 6 would thus seem to
apply with particular force to the type of analysis conducted below.
Yet without denying the wisdom of such an admonition, the
exploration presented here suggests that even this sound advice might
also be taken with a dose of caution. While the models below use only
minimal information about a bank's credit exposure, they nevertheless
could have predicted the significant insolvency risk for both CINB and
Citigroup, providing reason to question whether the recent hostility
directed toward credit models 27 may have gone too far. With sufficient
caution and a due regard for questioning a model's assumptions, the
analysis that follows suggests that even with their faults, credit risk
models can help facilitate the long-desired, but persistently evasive,
goal of providing a metric with which to probe a bank's portfolio risk.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a short
overview of the role of market discipline in bank regulation and the
unique challenges that have plagued both voluntary and mandatory
efforts at making banks more transparent to capital markets.
Motivated by the need to design a disclosure regime that is more
meaningful to market participants, Part III looks to how bank
managers themselves assess an institution's risk through the use of
credit risk modeling, highlighting both its conceptual simplicity and
the core set of parameter estimates used in most models. With this
background established, Part IV examines how modest changes to
prevailing bank disclosures to facilitate estimation of these
parameters, when combined with a standard, simulation-based credit
risk model, could have revealed the undercapitalization of both CINB
and Citigroup-two radically different banks that each required
significant
government intervention. Having established the
hypothetical benefits of a model-sensitive disclosure regime, Part V
examines how such a disclosure regime might be implemented and
assesses some of the practical challenges that would nevertheless
remain for effective market discipline, concluding that none of the
26.

See, e.g., NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SwAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY

IMPROBABLE 274-85 (2007) (arguing that financial models make useless predictions because they
fail to foretell rare, catastrophic events); Emanuel Derman, Models, 65 FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
Jan./Feb. 2009, at 28 (noting that, unlike models in the "hard" sciences, financial models reveal
only guesses at causal relationships between data and future outcomes); Erik Gerding, Code,
Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcingof FinancialRegulation to Risk Models and the Global
FinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 127, 169 (2009) ('The scope of the current global financial
crisis and the necessity of massive government intervention demonstrate the failure of the risk

models throughout the web.").
27. See sources cited supra note 26.
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challenges justify withholding from public disclosure the minimal
information used to design the models in Part IV. Part VI concludes.
II. MARKET DISCIPLINE AND BANKING
As noted previously, the notion that market discipline might
provide a meaningful complement to regulatory oversight of financial
institutions has come to play a central role in modern banking
regulation. 28 The basic motivation stems from the unique position of
banks as being at once central to economic stability while also being
vulnerable to systemic crises. By matching the needs of borrowers
having long-term funding requirements with lenders demanding
short-term deposits, banks represent a central source of liquidity in
29
the economy and provide a core source of financing for investment.
At the same time, however, if a bank's liquid reserves and assets are
insufficient to meet depositors' demands, a sudden withdrawal of
funds by depositors may cause a liquidity crisis for the bank.
Moreover, interlinkages among banks (real and imagined) might
simultaneously transmit financial distress from one institution to
another, potentially causing a self-fulfilling crisis of confidence in the
entire banking sector. 30
Over the years, concern with this basic threat to banks has led
to the creation of an extensive array of safety nets aimed at reducing
the risk of bank runs and their concomitant economic dislocations.
Most notably, federal deposit insurance and the liquidation strategies
used by bank regulators have greatly reduced the incentive of
depositors and other fixed claimants to engage in a traditional bank
run. 31 In so doing, however, such systems have also created the wellknown problem of moral hazard in banking that has amplified the
32
need for some form of prudential oversight of bank-lending activities.
In particular, by insulating depositors and most creditors from the
risk of loss, these regulatory safety nets induce a bank's suppliers of
capital to disregard the riskiness of a bank's loans and, in the process,
28. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 14 (arguing that market
discipline and public disclosure promote a more stable banking system).
29. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybuig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 403 (1983) (explaining the role of banks in the economy).
30. See Craig H. Furfine, Interbank Exposures: Quantifying the Risk of Contagion, 35 J.
MONEY CREDIT & BANKING 111, 125 (2003) (explaining how this self-fulfilling crisis can occur).
31. Jonathan R. Macey & Elizabeth H. Garrett, Market Discipline by Depositors: A
Summary of the Theoretical and EmpiricalArguments, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 215, 217-19 (1988).
32. Id.
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incentivize a bank's stockholders to increase the overall volatility of a
bank's business.3 3 Since the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation ("FDIC") in 1933, U.S. bank policy has therefore
developed an extensive regulatory apparatus to manage the risk of
moral hazard. Most notably, each U.S. commercial bank is closely
supervised by at least two regulatory agencies, each tasked with the
power to engage in periodic on-site exams, mandate regulatory filings,
establish capital adequacy requirements, and regulate lending
34
practices.
Although the original approach to addressing moral hazard in
banking focused on the promise of sound prudential regulation, two
events in the 1980s led regulators and commentators alike to call for
greater market discipline in policing against excessive risk-taking by
banks. First, a rash of banking failures during the early 1980s (in
particular, the monumental collapse of CINB discussed below)
highlighted the enormity of the challenge faced by banking
regulators. 35 Additionally, deregulation within the financial sector
simultaneously threatened to enlarge the moral hazard challenge in
banking by, among other things, allowing banks to pay higher interest
rates on federally insured deposit accounts. 36 In light of these events,

33. Id.
34. In general, the U.S. banking system is a dual banking system, consisting of federally
chartered (national) banks and state chartered (state) banks. The Office of Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC") is the primary regulator of all national banks, while state banking regulators
are the primary regulators of all state banks. All state banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System are additionally regulated by the Federal Reserve, while all state nonmember
banks are additionally regulated by the FDIC. The Federal Reserve also serves as a secondary
regulator for all national banks. Because the FDIC administers the federal deposit insurance
program, it also has regulatory authority over national banks and state member banks. In
addition to commercial banks, a number of other organizations engaged in banking activities
(e.g., thrifts, savings associations) are also generally subject to overlapping bank regulators. For
an overview, see Luigi De Ghenghi et al., United States, in THE BANKING REGULATION REVIEW
434, 435-36 (Jan Putnis ed., 2010).
35. See Douglass D. Evanoff, Preferred Sources of Market Discipline, 10 YALE J. ON REG.
347, 351 (1993) (summarizing how the regulatory problems of the 1980s led Congress to increase
the role of the depositor as a source of market discipline to supplement regulatory discipline).
36. As the FDIC stated in a 1984 policy statement:
Deregulation of the financial services industry is removing deposit interest rate controls
and other restrictions that previously constrained the actions of many institutions.
Because of the greater freedom within which financial institutions can operate, the
FDIC believes the supervisory efforts of the regulatory agencies must be supplemented
by market discipline to promote sound bank and thrift management.
Proposed Statement of Policy Regarding the Availability and Use of Financial and Other
Information by Depositors and Other Creditors of Banks and Thrifts, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,809
(proposed June 29, 1984).
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it was generally believed that market participants could potentially
provide an important ally in bank oversight. 37 In particular, with their
strong incentives to understand financial innovation, properly
motivated market participants could help ensure that a bank's
38
funding costs were better calibrated to its overall risk.
Notwithstanding this general enthusiasm for market
discipline, however, it was also widely acknowledged that the
conditions necessary for market participants to actually exert market
discipline might be difficult to attain. A central challenge facing
efforts to increase market discipline was that the very deposit
insurance that created such strong incentives for risk-taking also
diminished the incentive of depositors and creditors to monitor
banks. 39 For this reason, most advocates of greater market discipline
have generally focused on the potential of uninsured bank creditors
(such as subordinated bondholders), while also advocating for the need
to avoid implicit debt guarantees. 40 Indeed, a central goal of financial
regulation over the past two decades has been to redesign the safety
net in a fashion that maximizes the incentive of depositors and
creditors to monitor banks without precipitating a return to
traditional bank runs. For instance, both the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 41 ("FDICIA") in 1991 and
Dodd-Frank sought to reduce the implicit guarantee of a financial
institution's creditors beyond what was explicitly provided for by
42
federal deposit insurance.
37. See, e.g., Albert J. Boro, Jr., Banking Disclosure Regimes for Regulating Speculative
Behavior, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 431 (1986) (advancing the argument); Macey & Garrett, supra note
31, at 220-21 (same).
38. See Macey & Garrett, supra note 31, at 220-21 (explaining how properly motivated
participants encourage banks to calibrate funding to overall risk).
39. Id. at 220.
40. See, e.g., id. at 223-33 (advocating the elimination of bank settlement techniques that
effectively guarantee full protection for every depositor, regardless of the size of the deposit); see
also Mark Van Der Weide & Satish Kini, SubordinatedDebt: A Capital Markets Approach to
Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. REV. 195, 255 (2000) ("In order to implement a successful market
discipline approach to bank regulation, the federal government must credibly commit not to
insure the losses of the relevant market participants.").
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (2006).
42. In general, the FDICIA prohibits the FDIC from taking any action "that would have the
effect of increasing losses to any insurance fund by protecting ... depositors for more than the
insured portion of deposits [or] creditors other than depositors." 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(E)(i).
Among other things, Titles I and II of the Dodd-Frank Act created a new supervisory and
resolution framework designed to render any financial institution "resolveable" in a fashion that
would put at risk the value of shareholder and creditor claims. Whether or not this new
framework will function as planned, however, is a subject of considerable debate. See, e.g.,
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In addition to the need for market participants to have
sufficient incentives to monitor banks, a second, equally important
condition for effective market discipline is the availability of useful
and timely information concerning banks' lending activities. 43 Yet in
contrast to the considerable debate concerning ways to curtail implicit
government bank guarantees, considerably less academic attention
has been paid to this latter issue. Part of this intellectual reticence
may simply reflect a belief that with the proper incentives for
monitoring, market participants can be trusted to demand the
information they need to assess lending risks. 44 In the context of
banking, however, a number of factors above and beyond implicit
government subsidies may very well interfere with the operation of an
entirely voluntary disclosure regime. For one, as noted previously, a
bank's proprietary interest in protecting confidential information
concerning its lending strategies as well as concerns about protecting
the confidentiality of customer information may create strong
incentives for banks to resist disclosure concerning their credit
portfolios. 45 As discussed in more detail in Part V, even if market
participants impose an "opacity discount" on such institutions, highquality banks may nonetheless conclude that the discount is justified
46
by the benefits of maintaining secrecy in ordinary market conditions.
Equally important, the ability of market participants to
contract for appropriate bank disclosures has no doubt also been

Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the TooBig-to-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 986-1015 (2011) (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act
continues to permit the FDIC and other federal regulators to provide full protection for certain
creditors of large financial institutions).
43. See Krishna G. Mantripragada, Depositors As a Source of Market Discipline, 9 YALE J.
ON REG. 543, 559 (1992) ("Another important condition for an effective system of depositor-

imposed market discipline is the availability of relevant information to depositors on a timely
basis.").
44. Cf. Macey & Garrett, supra note 31, at 223 ("[I]n a market system unencumbered by
guarantees, depositors would demand contractual limitations on bank risks.").
45. See Boro, supra note 37, at 476 (advancing the argument that banks may have strong
incentives to resist disclosure). A vivid illustration of these concerns occurred in connection with
the SEC's 2009 proposal that money market funds make monthly, public disclosures of their
securities holdings. See, e.g., Letter from Federated Investors, Inc. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y
to the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, regarding File No. S7-11-09 (Sept. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/commentss7-11.09/s71l09-104.pdf (objecting to the public disclosure of
portfolio holdings on the basis that money market funds "would have a legitimate fear that, if
disclosed, certain information could be used to create a competitive disadvantage").
46. See infra notes 285-92 and accompanying text (explaining why investors may value
more granular portfolio information but may not receive it until exposures within a bank become
distressed).
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impeded by federal banking policy itself. Indeed, it is hardly an
exaggeration to say that federal banking policy during most of the
twentieth century was affirmatively hostile to the notion of bank
transparency. Inspired in large part by the banking panics of the past,
federal banking policy historically strived to withhold bank
information from the marketplace out of concern that any sign of
negative information could trigger a bank run.4 7 In the words of a
former Chief Counsel of the Office of Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), the traditional wisdom was that "[a]nything that smacked of
controversy was considered bad for the banking 'image.' "4s Moreover,
in addition to the need to prevent the loss of depositor confidence,
bank regulators also sought to keep confidential any information
concerning bank examinations and oversight to protect customer
49
privacy and to encourage banks to cooperate with their examiners.
By 1941, a congressional study thus concluded that "the exercise of
supervisory powers over banks has traditionally been attended by a
secrecy antithetical to the publicity which marks most regulatory
activities." 50 Indeed, the belief during this time that bank regulation
and oversight was best relegated to the confidential confine of bank
regulators was perhaps most tellingly revealed by the exclusion of
banks from the new mandatory disclosure regime implemented by the
Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange
51
Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act").

47. See Boro, supranote 37, at 437-38 (explaining history of federal policy encouraging the
withholding of bank information from the marketplace).
48. Robert Bloom, Hearing Procedures of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 31
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 723, 723 (1966).
49. See Roy A. Schotland, Re-Examining the Freedom of Information Act's Exemption 8:
Does It Give An Unduly 'Tull Service" Exemption for Bank Examination Reports and Related
Material?, 9 ADMIN. L.J. 43, 55 (1995) (quoting former FDIC Chairman Robert Barnett as saying,
"If the confidentiality is lost or the process becomes adversarial, there quite possibly would be a
deterioration in the quality of examinations.").
50. Boro, supra note 37, at 437 n.26.
51. See Michael P. Malloy, The 12(i)'ed Monster: Administration of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by the Federal Bank Regulatory Agencies, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 269, 277-81 (1990).
The exemption in the Securities Act of "any security issued or guaranteed by ... any bank" was
premised on the fact that Congress was simultaneously reforming banking regulation with the
Banking Act of 1933, which more directly expanded federal regulation of commercial banks. Id.
at 278. The issuance of bank securities, however, remained (and continues to remain) subject to
the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act. 15 U.S.C. §77q(a), (c) (2006). With regard to the
Exchange Act, the exemption of bank securities was the practical consequence of the fact that the
Exchange Act originally required registration only of those securities that were listed on a
national securities exchange, and very few commercial banks had listed securities. See Malloy,
supra, at 280 (noting that by 1963, the securities of only five banks were listed on any national
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Although federal banking policy increasingly grew to embrace
market discipline of banks during the 1980s, remnants of this
traditional attitude toward bank transparency have frequently created
inconsistencies in the regulation of bank disclosure. With respect to
federal securities disclosure, for instance, congressional concern in
1964 with the volume of OTC trading in the shares of banks and other
nonlisted companies ultimately prompted Congress to subject any
company with greater than 500 shareholders of record and $1 million
of assets to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Exchange
Act. 52 Yet while the move ended the three-decade exemption of many
banks from federal periodic disclosure obligations, section 12(i) of the
Exchange Act provided that the disclosure rules that would apply to
banks would nevertheless be the domain of their federal prudential
53
regulator, not the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC").
Given that the legislation as originally proposed vested enforcement
power exclusively in the SEC, this compromise left some doubt as to
whether Congress really intended to mandate full disclosure for
commercial banks. 54 Even as late as the 1980s, ambiguity regarding
whether banks were truly subject to the same level of disclosure as
other companies occasionally surfaced when banks accused of failing
to disclose adverse bank examinations sought to claim a
confidentiality privilege. 55 Writing in 1993, one former thrift regulator
went so far as to claim that the "schizophrenic approach to bank

securities exchange). Additionally, shortly after the Exchange Act was enacted, the SEC
promulgated Rule 12a-1 that exempted exchange-listed bank securities from the registration
requirement of the Exchange Act pending adoption of an appropriate registration form. In light
of the extremely small number of banks with listed securities, however, the form was never
adopted. See id. at 281 n.62 (explaining why a temporary exemption was never adopted).
52. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 56668 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2006)) (outlining the disclosure requirements of
companies that meet certain criteria).
53. In particular, section 12(i) provides that, with respect to banks, the administration and
enforcement of sections 12, 13, 14(a), 14(c), 14(d), 14(f), and 16 of the Exchange Act (as well as
certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) are vested in the bank's primary federal
banking regulator. 15 U.S.C. § 781(i). Notwithstanding this express delegation, all federal
banking regulators have simply chosen to incorporate by reference all of the SEC's rules
pertaining to these sections. See 12 C.F.R. § 33.101 (2011) (OCC); id. § 208.36 (Federal Reserve);
id. § 335.101 (FDIC). See generally Malloy, supra note 51, at 285-89 (examining the process by
which bank regulators incorporated by reference the SEC rules).
54. David G. Oedel, Civil Liability for the Concealment of Bank Trouble, 6 ANN. REV.
BANKING L. 443, 466 (1987).
55. See id. at 468-69 (explaining when banks seek to claim a confidentiality privilege).
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regulation and disclosure obligations persists to this day, and indeed,
5 6
can be said to be worse than at any other time."
Similarly, with respect to regulatory bank disclosures,
suspicion toward bank transparency has often resulted in inconsistent
disclosure policies, potentially sending mixed signals to the market
concerning what can and cannot be disclosed by a bank. For instance,
although all federally insured banks are required to submit quarterly
Reports of Condition and Reports of Income ("Call Reports") to the
FDIC, 57 it was not until 1972 that the FDIC made such reports
publicly available "to assist in maintaining public confidence in the
Nation's banks."58 As federal banking policy shifted during the 1980s
to increase the role of market discipline, Call Reports were revised to
increase the information available about a bank's loan portfolio, 59 but
even so, concern with preserving banks' proprietary interests and
customer privacy limited such disclosures to aggregate credit
metrics. 60 Moreover, voluntary efforts to enhance bank transparency
by banks have often been met with formal resistance by bank
regulators. Following reform of federal examination procedures in the
early 1990s, for instance, federal banking regulators prohibited banks
from disclosing to third parties the new capitalization categories in
which a bank was placed or the bank's examination rating. 61 And
throughout the current system of bank oversight, bank examination
reports have been deemed the property of bank regulators, subject to
strict prohibitions on their use and disclosure by banks 62 and
56. Schotland, supra note 49, at 97 (quoting C. Thomas Long).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(a); 12 C.F.R. § 304.3.
58. Public Disclosure of Reports of Condition, 37 Fed. Reg. 28,607-02 (Dec. 28, 1972).
59. See Notice of Request for Comments on the Proposed Revised Quarterly Report of
Condition and Income Required of All Insured Commercial Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 25,615 (June 14,
1982) (requesting comments on a proposal revising quarterly Call Reports to include, among
other things, more information "on past due, renegotiated, and non-accrual loans and leases, and
charge-offs to assist in determining credit quality"). The FDIC submitted final forms to the OMB
for approval in 47 Fed. Reg. 40,479-02 (Sept. 14, 1982).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 265-66 (discussing Call Report data). Some of these
additional disclosures would subsequently be removed from the public domain. See, e.g., Notice of
Public Disclosure of Reports of Condition, 55 Fed. Reg. 32,168 (Aug. 7, 1990) (notifying savings
associations that proprietary information concerning classified assets, specific valuation
allowances, and loans thirty to eighty-nine days past due but still accruing will be removed from
public disclosure thrift data).
61. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 325. 101(e) (2011) (FDIC prohibition on disclosure of capital categories).
62. E.g., id. § 4.36 (2011) ("All non-public OCC information remains the property of the
OCC. No supervised entity, government agency, person, or other party to whom the information
is made available, or any officer, director, employee, or agent thereof, may disclose non-public
OCC information without the prior written permission of the OCC .... ");FDIC, RISK
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specifically exempted from disclosure under the Freedom of
Information Act. 63 This conflicted approach toward bank disclosure
has no doubt cast an inhibiting pallor over market-based solutions for
making banks transparent to the capital markets. 64
In addition to suggesting why an entirely voluntary regime of
bank disclosure might result in suboptimal disclosures, the foregoing
discussion also highlights the difficult policy considerations at stake
when evaluating the options available for addressing this market
failure-a task made all the more pressing given the mandate for
greater bank transparency following the Financial Crisis. At the
extreme, for example, one could in principle simply advocate for a
model of full transparency such as that which applies to a number of
other financial intermediaries. Both money-market mutual funds and
insurers, for instance, are required to periodically disclose a full listing
of their investments on a position-by-position basis. 65 Yet given the
concerns about protecting customer information shared by both banks
and regulators, any such proponents would no doubt bear a heavy
burden of demonstrating that the benefits of such a disclosure regime
would justify its costs. Indeed, the task may very well be politically
insurmountable given that, even within the insurance market,
evidence suggests that market participants did not widely use
66
insurers' position-by-position disclosures during the Financial Crisis.
MANAGEMENT
MANUAL
OF EXAMINATION
POLICIES
§
1.1
(2005),
available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section-l.html ('The Report of Examination is
highly confidential. Although a copy is provided to the bank, that copy remains the property of
the FDIC. Without the FDIC's prior authorization, directors, officers, employees and agents of a
bank are not permitted to disclose the contents of a report.").
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (2006). See generally Schotland, supra note 49, at 99-106
(examining breadth of Exemption 8 to the Freedom of Information Act with regard to bank
examinations).
64. See, e.g., Press Release, FDIC, Interagency Advisory on the Confidentiality of the
Supervisory Rating and Other Nonpublic Supervisory Info. (Feb. 28, 2005), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/fmancial/2OO5/fill3O5.html (reminding banking institutions that,
while insurers may have begun requesting disclosure of the bank's CAMELS rating when
underwriting insurance policies, "they are prohibited by law from disclosing CAMELS rating and
other nonpublic supervisory information to insurers as well as other non-related third parties
without permission from the appropriate federal banking agency").
65. See 17 C.F.R. § 270.30bl-7 (requiring every money market fund to report publicly each
month information concerning each portfolio security held in the fund); Bartlett, supra note 22,
at 9 (describing disclosure regime applicable to monoline insurance companies, which requires
"detailed quarterly and annual disclosures concerning an insurer's holding of debt and equity
securities").
66. See Bartlett, supra note 22, at 25-42 ("[T]he general absence of any notable market
reaction to these significant CDO downgrades would seem to call into question whether
(portfolio-level] disclosures mattered at all.").
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Even aside from this particular disclosure option, however, the
historic opacity of banks would no doubt pose obstacles for even less
ambitious proposals. For in the absence of more granular, historical
data concerning banks' lending activities, any disclosure proposal will
risk revealing incrementally more information concerning a bank's
customers and proprietary strategies, yet will be lacking in empirical
support for how market participants can be expected to use the
information. Examining how best to increase bank transparency thus
requires not only sensitivity to the unique resistance to disclosure
within banking but also some willingness to experiment with
disclosure policy to enable a fuller understanding of how market
participants would use disclosed information. This need to design a
disclosure regime likely to be of use to market participants motivates
the following discussion of how banks themselves use information to
manage and understand the risk of their credit portfolios.
III. MODELING CREDIT RISK

A. An Overview of Credit Risk Analysis
Analyzing the credit risk associated with a loan portfolio is one
of the most critical challenges facing any financial institution. A
cursory review of the basic business model for a bank illustrates why.
Figure 1, for instance, presents a hypothetical balance sheet for a
simple bank. As the figure indicates, the vast majority of the bank's
assets consist of loans that the bank has funded primarily through a
combination of customer deposits and subordinated debt. A smaller
amount of funds has also been raised through the sale of equity
securities. This disproportionate reliance on debt financing (which, for
this purpose, includes deposits) is what allows a bank's equity
investors to realize potentially significant returns on their investment:
to the extent a bank's loans earn returns that exceed its cost of debt
financing, the excess returns accrue to the bank's equity investors.
But it is also for this same reason that a bank's balance sheet is
especially susceptible to the credit risk of its loan portfolio. For our
hypothetical bank, a small drop in the value of its loan portfolio would
be sufficient to render it insolvent.
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FIGURE 1: HYPOTHETICAL BANK BALANCE SHEET
Assets

Liabilities

Cash
Marketable Securities

$5
$40

Trading Book:
Total Gross Loans:
less loan loss reserve

$45
$1,000
($50)

Total (net) loans:
Other Assets
Total

Deposits
Subordinated Debt

$700
$200

$950
$5

Equity Capital

$100

$1,000

Liabilities + Equity

$1,000

In light of this risk, financial institutions undertake
considerable credit risk analysis due to both externally mandated
regulations 67 and internal risk management protocols. 68 It is also for
this reason that the past three decades have witnessed a considerable
evolution in credit risk modeling, with a single institution often
utilizing a number of different models to analyze its portfolio's credit
risk. 69 Yet notwithstanding this variation, at the core of virtually
every credit risk model is a recognition that credit risk is
fundamentally an elaborate form of a Bernoulli trial. 70 That is, the
primary risk of holding a loan-a borrower's default-resembles a
simple coin flip in that the borrower will either pay or not pay the
loan.
From this perspective, understanding the credit risk for a loan
therefore hinges on three initial parameters: a loan's exposure amount,
its probability of default, and its loss given default.71 To illustrate,
67. In particular, bank regulators impose specific capital requirements on banks to help
ensure there will be a capital cushion against the risk of loss from a loan portfolio. For a helpful
summary of the various regulations imposing capital requirements on financial institutions
(including banks), see Charles K Whitehead, Refraining FinancialRegulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1
app. B at 47 (2010).
68. In addition to having to ensure sufficient regulatory capital, a bank's managers also
analyze credit risk to ensure a bank has sufficient economic capital that represents
"management's internal assessment of the capital cushion to be provided to the asset or the line
of business." CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 23, at 362; see infra text accompanying notes 249-52.
69. See HULL, supra note 17, at 313-29 (providing an overview of credit risk quantification).
70. See ANTULIo N. BOMFIM, UNDERSTANDING CREDIT DERIVATIVES AND RELATED
INSTRUMENTS 316 (2005) (describing loan defaults as a sequence of Bernoulli trials).
71. CAOUETTE ET AL., supra note 23, at 277 ('Three main variables affect the credit risk of a
financial asset: (1) the probability of default (PD); (2) the loss given default (LGD), which is equal
to PD times one minus the recovery rate (RR); and (3) the exposure at default (EAD).").
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return again to the hypothetical bank discussed previously. If we
assume for simplicity that its loan portfolio consists of ten identical
loans of $100 each that are uncorrelated in their default risk,
analyzing the riskiness of this portfolio would require only two
additional pieces of information: an estimate of each loan's default
probability and how much the bank expects it could collect in the
event of a loan's default. For instance, if the bank believed there was a
5% chance each borrower would default over the next year and that it
would recover nothing in such a scenario, the bank would expect to
lose $50 (i.e., $100 [loss given default] x (0.05 x 10) [expected
defaults]) from its portfolio. Based on this analysis, it would then
establish a $50 loan loss reserve (as it has in Figure 1) as a means of
protecting against this default probability, otherwise known as
72
expected loss.
To the extent credit defaults resemble a Bernoulli trial,
however, using these loss reserves as the primary means to manage
credit risk will be insufficient due to the potential variance of actual
defaults. As in a series of coin flips, simple random variation will
cause actual defaults to depart from expected defaults, with the actual
results generally falling into the familiar binomial distribution with:
(a) a mean number of defaults equal to the product of the number of
loans (N) and the default probability (PD), and (b) a standard
deviation equal to [(N)(PD)(1-PD)]H.73 In the example above, if the
bank's loans are drawn from a population of loans having similar
default characteristics, the distribution of possible loan defaults (and
therefore default losses) will also tend to follow a binomial
distribution, albeit one having a mean equal to the expected loss of
$50 (i.e., $100 x 0.05 x 10) and a standard deviation equal to $68.92
(i.e., $100 x [(10)(0.05)(1-0.05)]'/).
To account for this potential variance, a bank's internal risk
managers as well as its prudential regulator will therefore require an
additional reserve of equity capital on top of the loan loss reserve. 74 A
common way to estimate this reserve for unexpected losses is to

72. See ANDREA RESTI & ANDREA SRoNi, RISK MANAGEMENT AND SHAREHOLDERS' VALUE IN
BANKING 281 (2007) ("[Ihe expected loss on a loan portfolio should give rise to... a reserve in
the bank's balance sheet.").
73. That a series of Bernoulli trials with a constant probability of success yields a binomial
distribution is a basic principle of probability theory.
74. See RESTI & SIRONI, supra note 72, at 281 ("[U]nexpected loss should be covered by the
bank's capital because, as the shareholders benefit from any results above expectations ... they
also must cover higher than expected losses with their own funds.").
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multiply the standard deviation of expected losses by a constant to
ensure that the bank has a sufficient amount of capital to absorb
unexpected losses with a given level of confidence. For example, both
the Basel Capital Accords and standard approaches to credit risk
management require using a constant that would allow a bank to
absorb 99.9% of the credit losses that could theoretically arise from its
credit portfolio over one year's time.7 5 Assuming credit losses are
approximately normally distributed, 76 this constant could be
calculated by taking the inverse of the standard normal cumulative
distribution at 99.9% confidence, yielding a reserve equal to 3.09
standard deviations of the expected loss. 77 The measure, generally
referred to as credit value-at-risk (or "credit VaR"), can then be used
by banks and banking regulators to determine the appropriate
amount of equity capital required to minimize the insolvency risk
posed by a bank's leveraged business model. In the case of our
hypothetical bank, this would translate into the bank holding equity
capital against the loan portfolio of $262.98 (i.e., $50 + 3.09 x
$68.92)-far more than the $100 of equity capital it has set aside in
Figure 1.
All of this, of course, ignores the beneficial effects of loan
diversification on credit risk. Rather than hold just ten loans of $100
each, our hypothetical bank would be well advised to diversify its
$1,000 loan book into a larger number of loans having uncorrelated

75. Federal Reserve Board, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPR) and Supporting Board
Documents, 71 Fed. Reg. 55830-01 (2006) (noting that the Basel II framework "for assessing
credit risk capital requirements is based on a 99.9% nominal confidence level, a one-year horizon,
and a supervisory model of credit losses embodying particular assumptions about the underlying
drivers of portfolio credit risk, including loss correlations among different asset types" and
further noting that the "framework is broadly similar to the credit VaR approaches used by
many banks as the basis for their internal assessment of the economic capital necessary to cover
credit risk").
76. This assumption stems from basic probability theory: for a sufficiently large number of
Bernoulli trials (e.g., coin flips), a binomial distribution can be approximated with a normal
distribution. In the example here, a portfolio of ten loans would be insufficient to justify such an
approximation; however, for expositional purposes, the normal approximation is used (as well as
in the paragraph that follows) to illustrate the procedure for estimating a reserve for unexpected
losses and the beneficial effects that loan diversification has on it.
77. In general, a standard normal variable X would have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1, and if each occurrence of the variable were observed and plotted, the distribution
of observations from negative infinity to positive infinity would be clustered at 0 with positive
and negative values tapering off on either side. In other words, the familiar bell-shaped curve
would appear. The inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution at 99.9% confidence
represents the value of X such that one would have a 99.9% probability of observing it or a
number less than it.
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default risk. Consistent with modern portfolio theory, doing so would
significantly reduce the variance of expected losses, thereby allowing
the bank to set aside considerably less capital to cover its unexpected
losses. For instance, by making 1,000 loans of $1 each (with each loan
having the same credit characteristics as in the original example), the
bank would continue to have an expected loss of $50 (i.e., a loss given
default of $1 x expected defaults of (0.05 x 1,000)), but the standard
deviation of expected losses would be reduced from $68.92 to $6.89
(i.e., $1 x [(1,000)(0.05)(1-0.05)] ). The 99.9% credit VaR would
similarly be reduced from $262.98 to $71.30 (i.e., $50 + 3.09 x $6.89).
Not surprisingly, a core principle of credit risk management-as well
as a core bank regulatory principle-is for financial institutions to
minimize the degree to which an institution is exposed to any single
78
borrower, or "name concentration."
Yet, while avoiding name concentration is a primary
consideration in bank risk management, a critical challenge for
financial institutions is that the default behavior of individual obligors
can often reveal strong dependencies with one another. A common
example involves two obligors who have substantial business ties-say
a vendor and its primary customer. To the extent the customer
represents a significant component of the vendor's business, credit
deterioration of the customer may result in credit deterioration of the
vendor. Risk concentrations may exist, however, even short of these
direct dependencies. For instance, obligors may be subject to common
risk factors that could cause them to default together, particularly
where firms operate within the same business sector. More generally,
the financial performance of firms will also depend on broader
macroeconomic factors leading to potential default dependencies even
among firms in different sectors. For these reasons, in addition to
measuring a loan's probability of default and loss given default,
effective credit risk management requires the measurement and
management of default correlations within a loan portfolio-a topic
that, as the following Section reveals, has produced no shortage of
79
measurement challenges.

78.

Klaus

Duellmann, Measuring Concentration Risk in

Credit Portfolios, in THE

ANALYTICS OF RISK MODEL VALIDATION 59, 59-64 (George Christodoulakis & Stephen Satchell

eds., 2008) (illustrating the need to measure and manage name concentration within a credit
portfolio).
79. See id. at 64-69 (illustrating a methodology for measuring sector concentrations); see
also GUNTER LOFFLER & PETER N. POSCH, CREDIT RISK MODELING USING EXCEL AND VBA 103-

18 (2007) (summarizing methodologies for measuring default correlation).
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B. Measurement Challenges in Credit Risk Analysis
Although the foregoing principles constitute a widely shared
foundation for modern credit risk management, any attempt to
implement them quickly gives rise to the need to measure the primary
parameters of interest. In the simple portfolio of 1,000 loans above, for
instance, the conclusion that the bank should hold $71.30 in capital
was based on an assumption that each loan had a one-year default
probability of 5% and a 100% loss given default. Each loan was also
assumed to have a zero default correlation with each other loan in the
portfolio-i.e., they were assumed to be independent flips of a cointhus avoiding the need to measure default dependencies. In the real
world, of course, each of these parameters would need to be measured.
In this domain, there is considerably less agreement on the proper
manner to undertake this process.
In general, the literature on credit risk measurement divides
itself into two main schools of thought often referred to as intensitybased (or reduced-form) and structural (or option-theoretic)
approaches.8 0 A complete description of each approach is beyond the
scope of this Article, but for present purposes it is helpful to
understand the contours of the latter approach as it currently
constitutes the dominant approach used within the industry as well as
by banking regulators. 81 As such, it provides a natural starting point
for examining how we might leverage existing credit risk technology to
82
construct a more meaningful disclosure regime.
80. Jorge Sobehart & Sean C. Keenan, New Challenges in Credit Risk Modeling and
Measurement in Risk Management: A Modern Perspective, in RISK MANAGEMENT 203, 225-26
(Michael Ong ed. 2006). A third, nontheoretical approach to measuring credit risk also exists
based on the pioneering work of Edward Altman. Id. This largely statistical approach seeks to
determine the relationship between a firm's default probability and various firm-specific
accounting variables as well as more general market data. Id.; see also Eric Talley & Johan
Walden, The Supervisor Capital Assessment Program: An Appraisal (June 2009), included as an
Appendix to CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: STRESS TESTING AND
SHORING UP CAPITAL 57-62 (June 2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-

111JPRT50104/pdf/CPRT-111JPRT50104.pdf (summarizing modern credit risk models as
representing either structural models or reduced form models).
81. See Sobehart & Keenan, supra note 80, at 226 ("Reduced form models are the approach
most widely used by academics and credit derivative trading desks for pricing debt
instruments.").
82. In general, the two approaches differ primarily in how they estimate a borrower's
default probability. Intensity-based (or reduced-form) approaches assume that the timing of a
borrower's default depends on an exogenous random process that is unrelated to any observable
characteristics of a firm (e.g., a firm's leverage or its cash flows). Id. Instead, defaults are
assumed to occur unexpectedly, with a firm's default probability being modeled as the result of a
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According to the structural approach, a firm's default behavior
can best be explained by starting with the empirical fact that when a
limited liability firm faces a potential default on its debt obligations,
its equity owners effectively have an option to pay off the firm's debt to
save the firm from bankruptcy.8 3 The reason stems from the absolute
priority rule, according to which equity holders stand as residual
claimants to the firm's assets given that debt holders are paid first in
the case of a default. Thus, if equity holders believe the value of the
firm's assets is greater than the value of its debt obligations, they can
choose to save the firm from insolvency by paying off its debt,
effectively "exercising" their right to its assets. Conversely, if the value
of the firm's assets falls beneath the value of its debt obligations, the
firm's equity holders will simply walk away (thanks to their limited
liability), in the same fashion as the holder of an out-of-the-money
stock option upon its expiration. In effect, the payoff to a firm's equity
holders is the same as the payoff of a European call option: nothing if
the firm's assets are worth less than its debt (i.e., the strike price); the
excess of the firm's asset value over its liabilities if otherwise.8 4
Significantly, recognizing that a firm's equity owners hold a de
facto call option on its assets permits an analysis of a firm's default
behavior using standard option pricing theory. To do so simply
requires two additional assumptions. The first is to assume that the
value of a firm's assets follows geometric Brownian motion, resulting
in a log-normal distribution of asset values.8 5 Figure 2 provides an
illustration. In general, the figure represents the value of a firm's
assets over time compared to the value of its liabilities. As the firm
proceeds through time over the x-axis, the value of its assets
fluctuates until the maturity date (T) of the firm's debt. As noted
above, if the firm's assets happen to fall below the value of its debt
obligations, the firm defaults. Assuming that its asset value follows a
stochastic process (generally a Poisson process) that can be calibrated from market-based
variables (such as bond spreads or CDS prices). Id. As such, the approach relies heavily on the
availability of market data. Id. As discussed in the text, structural models assume default occurs
when the value of a borrower's assets falls below the amount of its liabilities. See infra text
accompanying note 84.
83. See LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 27 (stating that equity holders possess a walkaway option as a result of limited liability and can therefore leave a firm that has a negative
equity value to the creditors).
84. Id. at 27, 29 (noting that since equity holders receive the residual value of the firm, the
value of equity is negative if the asset value is smaller than the value of liabilities, and, thus, the
payoff to equity holders can be described with the same mathematical formula as the payoff of a
European call option).
85. Id. at 27-28.
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log-normal distribution permits the estimation of this probability
using basic statistics.8 6 This statistical technique, however, requires
the current market value of the firm's assets and an estimate of their
volatility as inputs. To obtain these figures requires the second
additional assumption: for a publicly traded firm, the aggregate
market value of its equity securities is assumed to reflect the value of
equity holders' call option on the firm's assets.8 7 With this assumption,
a firm's asset value and its volatility can then be calculated by use of
88
the standard Black-Scholes call-option formula.
FIGURE 2: DEFAULT PROBABILITY IN THE STRUCTURAL MODEL
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The final result of this series of steps is to produce an estimate
of a firm's default probability. Given the assumptions required for the
process to work, it should come as no surprise that the resulting
estimates can be subject to considerable error. The distribution of a
particular firm's assets, for instance, may be more or less likely to
86.
87.
market
implies
88.

For a description of this estimation, see id. at 28.
See id. at 29 (noting that since the market value of assets is unobservable, but the
value of equity is available for publicly traded firms, "option pricing theory can help as it
a relationship between the unobservable ...and observable variables").
Id. at 29-30.
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follow a log-normal distribution. It is also not necessarily the case that
a firm only defaults at the maturity of its debt. As a result, other "first
passage" models permit default to occur at any time a firm's asset
value falls below the value of its liabilities. 8 9 The fact that many of the
assumptions underlying the model may not necessarily hold for
particular firms, as well as the fact that so many different structural
models exist at all, merely serves to emphasize the considerable
uncertainty that surrounds estimation of a firm's probability of
default.
Similar challenges plague the other two parameters needed to
estimate credit risk: loss given default ("LGD") and default
correlation. In the case of LGD, the uncertainty arises largely from
our relatively weak empirical understanding of what determines the
recovery rate of defaulted obligations. Early credit models generally
ignored this issue entirely and assumed a fixed rate. 90 The Basel
Committee, for instance, assessed a fixed 45% LGD on loans if they
were fully secured by physical, non-real-estate collateral, and 40% if
they were secured by receivables. 91 More recently, research has
indicated that there appears to be a stochastic component to LGD that
may fluctuate with both firm-specific and industry-wide factors. 92 As
will be discussed in more detail below, several credit models have
therefore resorted to estimating default risk on the assumption of
nonstable, random LGDs.
Finally, some of the greatest challenges in credit risk
measurement relate to estimating default correlation. 93 In theory, the
measurement of default correlation (represented by p) should reflect
the likelihood that if loan I defaults, loan J will also default. For
instance, if pj were equal to 1, loans I and J would always default
together, while if it were 0, they would default independently of one
another. Unfortunately, measuring such default correlations is made
difficult by the low level of defaults among firms in general
89. See, e.g., TOMASZ R. BIELECKI & MAREK RUTKOWSKI, CREDIT RISK: MODELING,
VALUATION AND HEDGING 65-120 (2002) ('The first-passage-time approach extends the original
Merton model by accounting for the observed feature that the default may occur not only at the
debt's maturity, but also prior to this date.").
90.

ANTHONY SAUNDERS & LINDA ALLEN, CREDIT RISK MEASUREMENT IN AND OUT OF THE

FINANCIAL CRISIS 135 (3d ed. 2010).
91. Id. at 135-37.
92. Id. at 139.
93. Sobehart & Keenan, supra note 80, at 224. For an overview of different approaches to
measuring default correlation and related empirical findings, see DE SERVIGNY & RENAULT,
supra note 23, at 167-212.
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(particularly among investment grade firms) as well as the practical
challenge of estimating correlation coefficients for even a moderately
94
sized loan portfolio.
Given these challenges, a common approach to modeling
default correlations is to rely on the structural approach to default
behavior discussed previously. 95 As represented in Figure 2, the
structural approach assumes that a firm defaults if its asset value
falls below a critical threshold determined by the level of its liabilities.
Under this approach, if two firms have a high default correlation,
their asset values should accordingly move together through time
causing them to both approach their respective default thresholds in a
correlated fashion.96 But what would cause their asset values to move
in this correlated fashion? An approach widely used in practice 97 as
well as adopted by the Basel Committee's capital adequacy rules98 is
to assume that each firm's asset value is a function of: (a) its
relationship to a common, systemic factor Z (e.g., the economy as a
whole) and (b) a firm-specific idiosyncratic component e:99
Ai =

i Z+

1- o?

(1)

The extent to which a particular firm's asset value (Ai) is
driven by a common, systemic factor versus an idiosyncratic factor is
then determined by the parameter Wi. Thus, much like the familiar
Capital Asset Pricing Model, a firm's asset value is assumed to be
completely determined by its correlation with a common, system-wide
variable (denoted by Z) as well as factors that are unique to the

94. Even in a simple portfolio with five hundred obligors, for instance, there would be 124,
750 (i.e., 500!/2!(500-2)!) pairs of default correlations.
95.

See

SRICHANDER

RAMASWAMY,

MANAGING

CREDIT

RISK

IN

CORPORATE

BOND

PORTFOLIOS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 100-02 (2004) (arguing that the default of an obligor is
assumed to occur if the asset returns of the obligor falls below a certain threshold value).
96. See id. (stating that since a firm's default is driven by changes in its asset value, the
correlation between the asset returns of two obligors can be used to compute the default
correlation between them, because "the joint probability of two firms defaulting within a certain
time period is simply the likelihood of both firms' asset values falling below their outstanding
liabilities").
97. LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 104.
98. See Paul H. Kupiec, Financial Stability and Basel II, 3 ANNALS FIN. 107, 108 (2007)
(explaining that the Basel II framework sets minimum regulatory capital requirements using a
model which "assumes the default risk is generated by Gaussian uncertainty and includes a
single common source of risk and independent risk factors for each credit").
99. For background information regarding the development of this equation, see LOFFLER &
POSCH, supra note 79, at 103-05.
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individual firm (denoted by Ei).' 00 For these reasons, to the extent the
assets of two, three, or more firms are highly correlated, it is assumed
to be through their correlation with the common factor Z. In short, by
estimating coi for each firm in a loan portfolio, we can estimate its
default correlation with all other firms in the portfolio.
Yet, while such an approach imposes some simplifying
structure on the challenge of estimating default correlations among
firms, it nonetheless raises the challenge of estimating coi for each
firm. A standard solution is to estimate a single factor sensitivity for
all obligors within a particular class of obligors-for example, all
investment grade debtors-for which there is data concerning their
historical default patterns. The parameter Wi can then be estimated
on a class-by-class basis for all firms in each class.1 0 1 Given the need
for estimating each firm's individual sensitivity to Z, the restriction
that each firm in a class must share a uniform factor sensitivity is
hardly ideal, but empirical research examining the possibility of
relaxing this restriction has generally found that imposing it produces
substantially more accurate estimates of factor loadings than more
02
flexible approaches.
In summary, by focusing on four core portfolio parametersexposure amount, probability of default, loss given default, and default
correlation-modern credit risk analysis provides a conceptual
foundation for identifying the type of aggregated, nongranular loan
information that market participants might use to assess a bank's
portfolio risk. At the same time, however, the considerable uncertainty
associated with estimating these parameters highlights the analytical
challenges any such market-based approach is likely to encounter in
assessing individual institutions. Imagining how market participants
100. As noted previously, a critical assumption of the structural approach is that asset
values are log-normally distributed. See supra text accompanying note 85. In equation (1), both Z
(the common factor) and E (the firm-specific factor) are assumed to be standard normal variables,
thereby making A, a standard normal variable as well. LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 10405.
101. A common technique is to calculate wi using maximum likelihood estimation. For an
illustration, see LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 108-14. The method was originally
proposed in MICHAEL GORDY & ERIK HEITFIELD, ESTIMATING DEFAULT CORRELATIONS FROM
SHORT PANELS OF CREDIT RATING PERFORMANCE DATA 7-9 (2002), available at
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.eduviewdocldownload?doi=10. 1.1. 131.8244&rep=repl&type=pdf.
102. See GORDY & HEITFIELD, supra note 101, at 9. The primary reason stems from the
limited number of years for which there is default data with which to calculate the maximum
likelihood estimation. See id. at 11.
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might nevertheless use information concerning these parameter
estimates in light of such challenges is a topic to which we now turn.
IV. CREDIT MODELS, DISCLOSURE, AND THE DETECTION OF RISKY

BANKS: Two CASE STUDIES

Given the foregoing discussion, the considerable opprobrium
directed toward those who advocate greater use of credit risk models
in banking regulation is hardly surprising.103 Even before the
Financial Crisis, the Basel Committee's decision to allow certain
banks to use their internal credit risk models to determine their
regulatory capital was met with significant opposition in part because
of concerns about uncertainties surrounding quantitative modeling of
credit risk. 10 4 That these same credit risk models were also used for
pricing the credit derivatives at the heart of the Financial Crisis only
served to accentuate this criticism. Indeed, even within the
mainstream media, credit models and their creators have become key
culprits in the morality tale that has emerged from the financial
collapse. 105
Notwithstanding the limitations of credit modeling, the fact
that virtually all modeling approaches use the same primary
parameters makes it an intriguing domain for considering how to
facilitate greater market discipline of financial institutions. In
particular, by analyzing portfolio credit risk in terms of the four
parameters discussed in Part III, credit models provide a common
language in the financial industry for analyzing credit risk with only
minimal information. For the same reasons, disclosure of these
parameter estimates should provide to the marketplace critical new
information concerning a bank's investment portfolio (and the risks
embedded in it) without the need to disclose proprietary position
information. Disclosure of these estimates would also permit market

103. See supranote 26.
104. See, e.g., New Basil Accord: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int'l
Monetary Policy, Trade, and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. (2003) (statement
of Donald E. Powell, Chairman, FDIC), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches
/archives/2003/sp27feb03.html ("It is important not to place exclusive reliance on quantitative
methods and models. Internal risk estimates are likely to be as robust as the credit culture in
which they are produced.").
105. E.g., Editorial, After the Crash: How Software Models Doomed the Markets, SCI. AM.,
Dec. 2008, at 45 ('rhe causes of this fiasco are multifold .. . but the rocket scientists and geeks
also bear their share of the blame."); see supra note 26.
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participants to examine for themselves the extent to which parameter
uncertainty poses a material risk to an institution.
To examine the potential of such a disclosure regime, the
following Part analyzes the extent to which basic credit risk modeling
was capable of detecting the portfolio risk at the center of two
important banking crises in recent history: the collapse of CINB in
1984 and the near collapse of Citigroup in 2008. Although the crises
differed significantly, the following Part reveals that the same basic
credit risk modeling technique, when combined with modestly
improved portfolio disclosures, was capable of revealing each firm's
undercapitalization well in advance of its distress. In neither case
would the disclosures have required the firms to reveal individual
position-level data, suggesting the potential for greater market
discipline of financial firms without the need to reveal proprietary
trading information.
A. Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company
1. Background
Until the failure of Washington Mutual in 2008, the collapse of
10 6
CINB in 1984 represented the largest bank failure in U.S. history.
With over $40 billion in assets at the time of its resolution by the
FDIC, 10 7 CINB stood as the sixth largest bank in the country with a
portfolio of loans that was truly national in scope. 08 Moreover, with
limited access to retail banking markets and core deposit funding
because of state branching restrictions, funding for this portfolio also
took on a national flavor as most of its loans were funded through
federal funds, negotiable certificates of deposit, and interbank
lending.' 09 When CINB experienced a significant decline in its loan
quality in late 1981, however, its access to these wholesale funding

106. For a discussion of the CINB rescue, see Itzhak Swary, Stock Market Reaction to
Regulatory Action in the Continental Illinois Crisis, 59 J. BUS. 451, 454 (1986) ("[The $4.5 billion
the FDIC provided as part of the Continental rescue represented 26.8% of its funds, a figure
larger than the combined total spent on all previous rescues.").
107. Inquiry into ContinentalIllinois Corp. and ContinentalNational Bank: HearingsBefore
the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. Supervision of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs,
98th Cong. 227 (1984) [hereinafter CINB Hearings] (app. to statement of C. T. Conover,
Comptroller of the Currency), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.orgfhistoricaldocs/678/download
/638231housecinb1984.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 235-36.
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sources quickly evaporated, with CINB losing 40% of its domestic
funding in 1982.110 Although it managed to secure additional funding
from European wholesale markets, mounting losses in its loan
portfolio through 1982 and 1983 eventually caused a crisis of
confidence among all of its wholesale lenders.'11 Faced with the
prospect of such a significant financial institution failing, the FDIC
ultimately arranged a rescue of the bank in May 1984, thus
introducing the term "too big to fail" into the modern lexicon. 112
With the benefit of hindsight, the collapse of CINB is
remarkable as much for its speed as for its size. Throughout the late
1970s and early 1980s, bank examiners uniformly provided positive
assessments of the bank's loan portfolio and management. In 1980, for
instance, the bank's examiners at the OCC conducted a comprehensive
review of the bank's loan approval and review process and reported
that "the results of these efforts were favorable to the bank and
revealed what is considered to be a generally efficient loan process."11 3
Moreover, the report emphasized that the bank had continued to
decrease the ratio of problem loans to capital from a ratio of 121% in
1976, to 80% in 1979, and finally to 61% in 1980.114 Although this ratio
would increase slightly to 67% the following year, 1 5 the examiners in
1981 continued to conclude that the overall system of loan origination
and management was "functioning well and accurately reporting the
more severely rated advances to the Board and senior
management."116
The overall satisfactory quality of CINB's loan portfolio was
also suggested by its financial reports. As shown in Figure 3, from
1976 to 1981, CINB's ratio of annual loan charge-offs to total loans
was consistently below that of its peer group, while the bank's loan110. Id. at 258-59.
111. Id. at 259-60, 273.
112. It was in the 1984 congressional hearings on the FDIC's intervention that the term "too
big to fail" was popularized by Congressman Stewart McKinney. See WALTER ADAMS & JAMES W.
BROCK,

THE BIGNESS

COMPLEX: INDUSTRY,

LABOR, AND

GOVERNMENT

IN THE AMERICAN

ECONOMY 293 (1986) ("We have a new kind of bank. It is called too big to fail, TBTF, and it is a
wonderful bank." (quoting Congressman McKinney)).
113. SUBCOMM. ON FIN. INSTS. SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INS. COMM. ON BANKING, FIN.
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, EXAMINATION FINDINGS REGARDING CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL
BANK'S LOAN MANAGEMENT AND CAPITAL 8 (1984) [hereinafter CINB LOAN MANAGEMENT

REPORT], available at http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/house/download/66197/19840918
hrexamci.pdf.
114. Id. at 3.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 9.
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loss provisions similarly lagged that of its peers from 1979 to 1981. As
Figure 3 indicates, though, the quality of its loans deteriorated
dramatically in 1982.
FIGURE 3: CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS LOAN PERFORMANCE AND LOANLOSS PROVISIONING VS. PEER GROUP, 1976-1983
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What prompted this sudden increase in nonperforming loans?
While subsequent investigation of CINB would reveal a fair degree of
mismanagement, 11 7 much of CINB's dramatic change in circumstances
stemmed from the bank's rapid expansion in the late 1970s and early
1980s.118 Beginning in 1976 under the stewardship of its chief
executive officer Roger Anderson, CINB embarked on an aggressive
expansion of its lending business in an effort to become one of the
nation's largest banks.1 9 A core component of this growth strategy
was expanding the bank's commercial and industrial ("C&I") loan
portfolio, which the bank grew from $4.9 billion in 1974 to $14.3
billion in 1981.120 Within its C&I business, the bank was especially
aggressive in extending loans to the energy sector. The 1973 oil
embargo produced a significant demand for domestic oil production,
and CINB was quick to target oil-producing states such as Texas and

117.
118.
119.
120.

See id. at 11-12.
See CINB Hearings,supra note 107, at 231.
See id. at 230-32.
Id. at 231.
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Oklahoma as key areas for expanding its loan business. 121 Moreover,
an informal relationship in Oklahoma with Penn Square National
Bank gave it access to a large number of loan syndications that were
being sourced through Penn Square's office in Oklahoma City. 122 As a
result of these efforts, by 1981, Continental's energy portfolio
1 23
represented 20% of its total loans and 47% of its total C&I loans.
When an excess worldwide supply of crude oil drove the energy
sector into a recession in late 1981, this heavy concentration in energy
loans naturally produced a significant stress in CINB's loan portfolio.
While CINB experienced losses throughout its portfolio, its
concentration of energy loans was at the heart of the bank's
misfortunes.1 24 From June 1982 through June 1983, energy-related
loans would represent 67% of CINB's total loan losses, with 41% of
1 25
these losses stemming from loans purchased from Penn Square.
2. Modeling CINB's Portfolio Risk
Given the concentrated nature of CINB's credit losses,
subsequent analyses of the bank's failure were quick to note the risk
inherent in its aggressive expansion plan. For instance, a
congressional investigative report noted in 1984 that the "lending and
management practices that Continental had to adopt in order to reach
its corporate goals . . . made it particularly vulnerable to the effects of
the recession." 126 Similar allegations of reckless portfolio management
would also be made twenty-five years later when large numbers of
commercial banks collapsed under the weight of their concentrated
127
portfolios of real estate loans.
Yet, while such conclusions were undoubtedly accurate ex post,
the harder issue raised by the failure of banks with concentrated loan
portfolios is understanding how market participants might better

121. Id. at 233.
122. See id. at 250. Loan purchases from Penn Square were especially pronounced from 1980
to 1982. See id. at 250-51. As of the end of 1980, for instance, CINB had purchased over $167
million of energy loans from Penn Square. Id. at 250. By 1981, this amount would increase to
$500 million, with another $600 million being purchased by 1982. Id. at 250-51. At its peak,
CINB would hold $1.1 billion of loans originated through Penn Square, representing 17% of
CINB's total oil and gas loan portfolio. Id. at 251.
123. Id. at 245.
124. Id. at 263-64.
125. Id. at 264-65.
126. CINB LOAN MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 113, at 4.
127. See infra note 165 (discussing material loss reviews conducted in 2009 and 2010).
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understand ex ante-and therefore price-the risks that a particular
portfolio of loans poses to a bank's solvency. Even where a bank
discloses that its loan portfolio might have one or more
concentrations, 128 not all loan concentrations necessarily lead to
banking failures. After all, some banks may simply have expertise -in
making loans of a particular type or in a particular region and
managing their associated risks. How can market participants identify
those banks that build concentrated loan portfolios without managing
their attendant risks?
The CINB experience suggests that combining basic credit risk
modeling techniques with moderately improved portfolio disclosures
may very well provide an answer. Like most banks today, CINB's
periodic Call Reports provided the total dollar value for the bank's
loan portfolio and the aggregate dollar value of all C&I loans, but
these public disclosures otherwise provided few details concerning the
structure of its loan portfolio. 129 In contrast, by providing a glimpse
inside this portfolio, a congressional investigation of the bank's failure
in 1984 permits the construction of a hypothetical portfolio model that
illustrates the significant risk a portfolio such as CINB's could pose.
Notably, the exercise requires surprisingly little proprietary
information about CINB's actual loan holdings.
In particular, two simple facts revealed during the
congressional investigation-that the average exposure amount for a
C&I loan at CINB was approximately $6 million and that its C&I
portfolio had a 50% exposure to the energy sector 13 0-are all the
additional information needed to begin building a hypothetical
portfolio model of the bank's C&I loan portfolio at the height of its
expansion in 1981. Indeed, because banks are likely to have
in their loan sizes and industry
idiosyncratic differences
128. For instance, SFAS-107 requires a financial institution to disclose "significant
concentrations of credit risk . . . whether from an individual counterparty or groups of
counterparties." See DISCLOSURES ABOUT FAIR VALUE OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS, Statement of

15A (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1991), available at
Fin. Accounting Standards No. 107,
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aopFAS107.pdf. Whether or not a significant concentration risk exists is
to be determined in the bank's judgment. See TERMS OF LOAN PRODUCTS THAT MAY GIVE RISE TO

A CONCENTRATION OF CREDIT RISK, Staff Position Statement No. SOP 94-6-1 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 2005), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fsp-sop94-6-1.pdf.
129. See Boro, supra note 37, at 446-48 (describing paucity of disclosures concerning a
bank's loan book through the mid-1980s).
130. See supra text accompanying note 123 (noting proportion of energy loans in the C&I
portfolio). The estimate for the average exposure amount was derived from the Comptroller's
statement that 375 loans, totaling $2.4 billion, had not been reviewed by CINB's rating
committee within one year. CINB Hearings,supra note 107, at 248.
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concentrations,
information
concerning
these
two portfolio
characteristics is perhaps the most critical information that is not
publicly disclosed by banks but that is necessary to build a credit risk
model. As shown below, estimates of the other parameters of interest,
in contrast, can often be made using a bank's aggregate portfolio
disclosures along with the significant amount of empirical research on
credit risk.
Consider, for instance, how an analyst today might evaluate a
bank like CINB knowing only that it has a $14.3 billion portfolio of
C&I loans having a 50% exposure to the energy sector and an average
exposure amount of $6 million. In the absence of the bank's disclosure
of the other parameters needed to model the portfolio, analysis of the
portfolio might begin by simply estimating each loan's probability of
default and loss given default by using one of several studies
examining historical one-year default rates and recovery rates among
credits of differing investment grades and industries. For example,
research by Astrid Van Landschoot and Norbert Jobst suggests a oneyear default rate among energy-related corporate debtors of
approximately 1.7%,131 while data from Standard & Poor's indicates
that bank debt has historically shown an average loss given default of
22.5%.132

Given CINB's relatively low loan-loss rate through

1981,133

the model below assumes for simplicity a slightly lower annual default
rate of 1.0%. Likewise, an estimate of the loans' correlation structure
can also be taken from the large literature examining asset
correlations. 134 For instance, using corporate loan data, Fitch Ratings
estimated an asset correlation for corporate credits of 5.15%, yielding
a coi for equation (1) of 22.7%.135 Lastly, given that the C&I portfolio
totaled $14.3 billion, an average exposure amount of $6 million would
suggest a portfolio of 2,383 loans. Table 1 summarizes these
estimates. To be sure, using such basic estimates oversimplifies the

131. Astrid Van Landschoot & Norbert Jobst, Rating Migration and Asset Correlation:
Structured Versus Corporate Portfolios, in THE HANDBOOK OF STRUCTURED FINANCE 217, 235
(Arnaud de Servigny & Norbert Jobst eds., 2007).
132. See STANDARD & POOR'S, ANNUAL 2005 GLOBAL CORPORATE DEFAULT STUDY AND
RATING TRANSITIONS 26 tbl. 17 (2006) (showing recovery rate of 77.5% for bank debt).
133. See supra fig.3.
134. For an overview of this literature, see Peter Grundke, Regulatory Treatment of the
Double Default Effect Under the New Basel Accord: How Conservative Is It?, 2 REV. MANAGERIAL
SCI. 37, 46-50 (2007) (summarizing the findings of twenty studies).
135. FITCH RATINGS, BASEL II CORRELATION VALUES: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EL, UL AND
THE IRB MODEL 9 (2008), available at http://www.securitization.net/pdf/Fitch/BaselIl19MayO8.pdf. wi represents the square root of asset correlation. See HULL, supra note 17, at 217.
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structure of the portfolio (e.g., Table 1 ignores the possible existence of
name concentration), but they nevertheless provide a starting point
for our analyst's examination of the portfolio's credit risk. Equally
important for our purposes, starting with such basic estimates also
provides a benchmark for examining how disclosing incrementally
more information concerning the portfolio's structure can affect an
analyst's portfolio model.
TABLE 1: PARAMETER ESTIMATES FOR A HYPOTHETICAL C&I
PORTFOLIO
Parameter
Average Exposure:
Probability of Default:
Loss Given Default:
Factor Correlation:
Total Loans:

Estimate
$6 million
1.0%
22.5%
22.7%
2,383

Following the estimation of the loan portfolio, the analysis of
its credit risk can then proceed by using a standard Monte Carlo
procedure. In general, the fact that each loan in a portfolio is assumed
to default based on a combination of its own idiosyncratic risk as well
as its correlation with a random, systemic factor Z makes it extremely
a portfolio's probable
challenging to evaluate analytically
performance. A Monte Carlo procedure facilitates this analysis
through use of a computational algorithm that relies on repeated
sampling of random variables to simulate the performance of a loan
portfolio several thousand times. By creating a dataset of thousands of
hypothetical one-year portfolio values, the procedure provides
information regarding the range of credit losses that can be expected
from a particular portfolio as well as the frequency with which these
losses occurred in the simulations. As such, it can provide critical
insight into the extent to which a bank is adequately capitalized to
absorb potential losses.
For purposes of the present study, the Monte Carlo procedure
used was based on a Visual Basic algorithm written in Microsoft Excel
that simulated the structural model of default discussed previously. 136

136. The basic framework for the VBA program was inspired by the simulation code used in
LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 135-37. The VBA code is available from the author upon

request.
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In particular, for each simulation, the asset value of each of the 2,383
borrowers as of the end of 1982 was determined based on equation (1)
following: (a) a random draw of a standard normal variable for each
borrower (the idiosyncratic component, Ei) and (b) a random draw of a
standard normal variable that applied to all borrowers (the systemic
component, Z). 137 After applying equation (1), those borrowers whose
asset values fell below their default threshold (based on a probability
of default of 1.0%) were deemed to have defaulted. 138 From Table 1,
defaulted loans were then assumed to suffer an average loss in value
of 22.5%. To capture the significant variance in empirical recovery
rates, the exact loss for each default was based on a second algorithm
in which the recovery rate was randomly drawn from a beta
distribution. 139 Finally, each simulation summed these losses across
all 2,383 loans to obtain an estimate of the total losses that might be
expected over one year in CINB's C&I loan portfolio.
By repeating the simulation 100,000 times, this basic model
generated the distribution of portfolio losses summarized in Table 2
(Simulation 1).

137. Given the assumption that Z and ei are standard normal variables, each firm's asset
value will also be standard normal by construction. The assumption that both factors represent
standard normal variables (and that Ai is therefore standard normal) is consistent with the
structural model discussed previously and is widely used in credit risk management. See id. at
104-05. In recent years, however, models increasingly use the multivariate Student tdistribution, which provides greater tail correlation than a normal distribution. See id. at 138;
HULL, supra note 17, at 214-15. The assumption of normality is relaxed below.
138. Because each firm's asset value is standard normal, its default threshold can be
calculated using the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution, in this case (D-1(.01)
or -2.33.
139. Empirical studies of debt recovery rates have revealed significant variation within
different asset classes. For instance, while bank loans have a mean 22.5% loss given default
("LGD"), they have a 30.9% standard deviation, suggesting substantial variation. LOFFLER &
POSCH, supra note 79, at 140 tbl.6.5. To model this variation, a standard approach is to assume
that LGDs follow some parametric distribution, with the parameters calibrated to observed data.
Id. at 140. For purposes of the Monte Carlo procedure used here, LGD was determined using a
random draw from the commonly used beta distribution whose shape parameters were based on
a mean and variance of the LGDs for bank loans (i.e., .225 and .309 2, respectively). For a
discussion of this methodology, see id.
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TABLE 2: PORTFOLIO LOSS BY DECILE AFTER 100,000 SIMULATIONS

Decile

Portfolio Loss
(in millions)

No. of
Loan Defaults

Z
Realization

10%
20%
30%

$7.67
$12.66
$17.12

9
9
16

0.97
1.21
0.66

40%
50%

$21.62
$26.36

24
22

(0.39)
(0.64)

60%
70%

$31.70
$39.21

20
28

(0.27)
(0.53)

80%

$47.28

41

(1.47)

90%

$62.02

30

(0.30)

As the table indicates, fewer than thirty loans defaulted in the
vast majority of the simulations, leading to relatively low portfolio
losses. Moreover, even for 90% of the simulations, there were fewer
than fifty defaults, producing at most an aggregate portfolio loss of
just $62.02 million.
Yet while Table 2 appears to suggest a fairly low level of credit
risk for the portfolio, it provides a potentially misleading depiction for
several reasons. First, dividing the simulator results into deciles
provides little information about the extent to which the modeled
portfolio might suffer losses under extreme stress. In the simulation
above, for instance, Table 2 indicates that in 90% of the simulations,
the portfolio suffered no greater than a $62 million loss, but it says
nothing about how much the portfolio lost in the remaining 10% of the
simulations. Assessment of such "tail risk" is especially important
where a portfolio consists of credits with a low default probability and
some degree of default correlation. In such situations, loans will both
survive together and default together, raising the possibility that
portfolio losses will increase dramatically in the tail of the distribution
as multiple loans default at once.
For this reason, a standard approach to analyzing Monte Carlo
simulations is to examine portfolio losses through the 99.9th
140
percentile of the loss distribution (or the 99.9% confidence interval).
Even here, an alternative risk measure is frequently used to examine
tail risk beyond this measure. Generally called "expected shortfall" or
"conditional value at risk," this latter risk measure provides a

140. See HULL, supra note 17, at 321-22.
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summary of the expected loss in a simulated portfolio beyond a
particular loss percentile.' 41 For instance, expected shortfall at 99.9%
confidence would provide the average loss generated by the simulator
in the worst 0.1% of the simulations.
Using these alternative risk measures, analysis of Simulation 1
reveals that portfolio losses could in fact be far greater than $62
million. In particular, examination of the 99.0th through 99.9th
percentile of the simulated results reveals some evidence of default
clustering, summarized in Table 3.
TABLE 3: PORTFOLIO Loss DISTRIBUTION FROM 99.0% TO 99.9%
CONFIDENCE AFTER

100,000 SIMULATIONS

Portfolio Loss
(in millions)

No. of Loan
Defaults

Z
Realization

99.0%
99.1%
99.2%
99.3%

$111.37
$113.01
$115.91
$117.74

79
82
82
74

(2.10)
(2.44)
(2.25)
(2.24)

99.4%

$121.66

77

(1.99)

99.5%
99.6%
99.7%
99.8%
99.9%

$124.44
$131.41
$134.86
$141.93
$160.76

92
100
87
92
111

(2.71)
(2.53)
(2.36)
(2.62)
(2.89)

Not surprisingly, losses beyond 99.9% confidence were even
more severe, with expected shortfall at 99.9% confidence reaching
$181 million.
Yet even with this adjustment, our hypothetical analyst could
still improve her analysis of the portfolio's risk in several ways. For
one, the foregoing analysis made a common assumption that each
borrower's asset values are normally distributed, with default
correlations being modeled through a normal or Gaussian copula. As a
number of commentators have suggested, this distributional
assumption may fail to capture the fact that a firm's asset value might
exhibit more extreme movements than suggested in a normal
distribution, causing the Gaussian copula to underestimate the degree

141. See DE SERVIGNY & RENAULT, supra note 23, at 241-42.
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of default dependence between loans in a portfolio.' 42 To the extent
this is the case, using an alternative distributional assumption having
"thicker tails" would provide a more conservative means to assess joint
default behavior. 143 A popular candidate in this regard is the Student
144
t-distribution with minimal degrees of freedom.
Additionally, as noted above, relying on existing empirical
research to estimate so many portfolio parameters obviously runs the
risk of misrepresenting the portfolio's true structure, as does
assuming all loans are identical in their four parameter estimates. To
the extent one can obtain additional details regarding the loan
portfolio, the portfolio analysis should therefore be all the more
accurate. In the present case, the congressional investigation into
CINB's collapse provided at least two additional facts that illustrate
the incremental benefits of receiving additional, general information
about a loan portfolio's structure.
First, as noted previously, the CINB investigation indicated
that nearly half of its C&I portfolio consisted of loans made to
borrowers in the U.S. energy sector. Given that the economic fortunes
of these borrowers would likely rise and fall together, this additional
fact suggests that the single-factor model used above might ignore an
important correlation structure within the portfolio. In light of this
additional information, the model would ideally permit the ability to
use both the systemic factor Zi as well as an additional industryspecific factor Z 2 to account for the portfolio's industry
45
concentration. 1
Second, testimony provided by the Comptroller of the Currency
indicated that the assumption of homogenous exposure amounts was
also inappropriate. In particular, the Comptroller discussed two
nonperforming oil and gas loans having an aggregate balance of $85
million, 146 suggesting certain C&I loans might well exceed $6 million
in exposure amount. Reports concerning CINB's exposure to several
prominent bankruptcies during the early 1980s confirm the likelihood
of several large exposures. For instance, its loans to bankrupt
companies included a $200 million loan to American Harvester, a $200
million loan to Dome Petroleum, a $173 million loan to NuCorp
Energy, and a $100 million loan to the Mexican Grupo Industrial
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See supra note 137.
See HULL, supra notei7, at 214-15.
See id.
See LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 137-38 (discussing multifactor models).
CINB Hearings, supranote 107, at 247.
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Alfa. 147 Additional reports of CINB's C&I loans also suggest that
several were substantially lower than $6 million. 148 While modeling
CINB's portfolio risk need not include such specific loan-level
information, the model should at a minimum incorporate the fact that
CINB's portfolio included some degree of name concentration.
To accommodate the foregoing concerns, a number of
adjustments to the original simulation model were therefore made.
First, to accommodate concerns about non-normality of asset returns,
the original simulation was rerun with the exception that Z and El
were each drawn from a Student t-distribution with three degrees of
freedom rather than a standard normal distribution, producing a
multivariate Student t-distribution for Ai (Simulation 2).149 Because a
Student t-distribution with minimal degrees of freedom is
characterized by so-called "fat tails," using this alternative
distribution provides a more conservative estimate of how often a
random variable (such as the state of the economy or an individual
150
borrower) experiences a negative event.
Next, to address the significant concentration of loans within
the energy sector, Simulation 2 was further modified in Simulation 3
so that the asset value of each obligor was determined using the
following two-factor model, rather than the single-factor model set

forth in equation
Ai

(1):151

=

aOikZk +

1

-

(

(2)

In this modified equation, the one-year asset value for each
obligor was a function of both its own idiosyncratic factor (ei) as well
as: (a) its correlation with a single systemic factor affecting all obligors
(now denoted Z 1) and (b) an additional industry-specific factor
affecting obligors in the energy sector (Z 2). As with Simulation 2, each

147. See 2 INTERNATIONAL DIRECTORY OF COMPANY HISTORIES 262 (Lisa Mirabile ed., 1990).
148. See, e.g., MARK SINGER, FUNNY MONEY 65 (1985) (describing three loan participations
purchased by CINB of $1 million and $1.5 million).
149. A Student t-distribution with minimal degrees of freedom is often used in portfolio
models to produce greater dependencies among asset values. See HULL, supra note 17, at 214-15;
LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 138-39.
150. The means to implement this change to the model is described more fully in LOFFLER &
POSCH, supranote 79, at 138-39. In effect, the procedure models the default correlation of loans
within a portfolio through a Student t copula function rather than the much-criticized Gaussian
copula. Id.
151. See HULL, supra note 17, at 210 (discussing multifactor models); LOFFLER & POSCH,
supra note 79, at 137-38 (same).
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factor was assumed to represent a random variable that was tdistributed with three degrees of freedom. Similarly, empirical
research on asset correlations was once again used to estimate the
relevant correlation parameters (i.e., wil and Wi2 ) for each factor. For
instance, using a similar two-factor model to measure asset
correlations among different industries, Van Landschoot and Jobst
found energy firms to have a correlation with the general market of
6.3% and an intra-industry correlation of 14.7%.152 Given that
approximately half of CINB's loans were in the energy sector,
Simulation 3 therefore assumed that one-half of the loans had a 14.7%
correlation with Z2 and a 6.3% correlation with Zi. The other half of
the loans, in contrast, were assumed to have solely a 6.3% correlation
with Z1 . For simplicity, Simulation 3 also assumed that the factors Z
153
and Z2 were independent from one another.
Finally, to address heterogeneity in loan size, adjustments
were then made to Simulation 3 to reflect the existence of both large
and small loans in CINB's portfolio. Specifically, in light of the
anecdotal evidence discussed previously, this last simulation
(Simulation 4) assumed that the portfolio included twenty loans at
$200 million, twenty loans at $100 million, and twenty loans at $50
million. To ensure an average loan exposure of $6 million, it also
assumed that the remainder of the portfolio consisted of 2,317 loans at
$3.15 million. Because of the proportion of energy-related loans in the
portfolio, half of the loans in each size category were deemed energy
loans. While the absence of more specific data on the distribution of
CINB's loan sizes is less than ideal, using these estimates nonetheless
provides an opportunity to examine how knowledge about loan size
within a portfolio can affect a portfolio model's analysis.
Figure 4 illustrates the consequence of each of these
modifications on the tail distribution of the hypothetical C&I loan
portfolio.154 The top, relatively flat line represents the tail distribution
of the original credit model in Simulation 1. As set forth in Table 3,
estimated portfolio losses in the 99th to 99.9th percentile of
Simulation 1 ranged from $111 million to $161 million. Moving from
top to bottom in Figure 4, the second line represents the tail
distribution of Simulation 2, which assumed that borrowers' asset

152. See Van Landschoot & Jobst, supra note 131, at 234.
153. See id.
154. As before, each version of the modified model was simulated one hundred thousand
times.
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values followed a fat-tailed Student t-distribution rather than the
common practice of assuming normally distributed asset values. As
the figure illustrates, modifying this assumption had a dramatic effect
on the estimated tail losses for the portfolio: at 99.0% to 99.9%
confidence, losses now ranged from approximately $600 million to
almost $1.2 billion. As one might have predicted, estimated losses also
increased upon accounting for the portfolio's industry- and nameconcentration. The third line, for instance, indicates that accounting
for the portfolio's energy concentration in Simulation 3 increased
estimated losses at 99.9% confidence by an additional $200 million to
$1.4 billion, while accounting for name concentration in Simulation 4
increased them further still. In particular, adding an element of name
concentration to the portfolio increased expected losses at 99.9%
confidence to almost $1.5 billion. Expected shortfall at 99.9%
confidence for each modification similarly showed a uniform increase
from $160 million in Simulation 1 to $1.3 billion, $1.5 billion, and $1.6
billion in Simulations 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIO LOSSES USING FOUR
ALTERNATIVE SIMULATIONS
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3. Model Assessment
To be sure, given the large number of assumptions used in the
foregoing modeling exercise, these loss figures can at best be
understood as "back-of-the-envelope" estimates of how a loan portfolio
such as CINB's might perform under conditions of stress. At the same
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time, they nevertheless reveal a number of important attributes about
the risk of the portfolio. For one, the simulations help reveal the
consequence of loan concentrations: if and when severe adverse
conditions struck CINB's portfolio, losses would not be gradual but
shockingly fast.
In addition, these rough estimates might also be useful for
market participants to better understand a financial institution's
capital adequacy. A central conclusion of the OCC examiner report
following the collapse of CINB was that its high loan growth was not
supported by adequate loan management or capital levels to account
for the possibility of loan defaults. 15 5 Nor was this inadequacy detected
by the OCC in its earlier examinations. 156 While the type of modeling
used previously was not typically conducted at the time of CINB's
collapse, it is easy to imagine how a similar failure of capital
management and regulatory oversight might be more difficult today if
market participants had access to the information used to undertake
the foregoing simulations. For instance, an analyst performing the
exercise undertaken in the prior Section might find it surprising that
a bank whose C&I portfolio had a potential 99.9% credit VaR of $1.5
billion held only $1.8 billion of capital for its entire loan portfolio, as
was the case with CINB in the spring of 1981.157 This would be
especially true if, as was the case with CINB, its C&I loans
158
represented just 44% of the bank's total loans.
For similar reasons, this type of credit modeling could also help
illuminate how the portfolio would perform under severely stressed
conditions or if certain risks were otherwise underestimated. Imagine,
for instance, that the parameter estimates used previously had
actually been disclosed by our hypothetical bank. With this
information in hand, the foregoing modeling technique provides a
ready means by which market participants can stress test the

155. CINB LOAN MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 113, at 6 (noting that CINB's "reduced
capital position made it difficult to absorb the losses associated with both greater lending and a
deteriorating loan management system").
156. The house subcommittee report on the OCC's examinations of CINB was especially
critical of the OCC on this front. See, e.g., id. at 15 ("For the examiners to continue to refrain
from outright criticism of CINB's capital position for so many years is difficult to understand.").
157. Id. at 18.
158. Total loans held by CINB at the end of 1981 stood at approximately $33 billion. See
SUBCOMM. ON FIN. INSTS. SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND INS., COMM. ON BANKING, FIN., AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK: A

CHRONOLOGY AND PEER GROUP COMPARISON 9 (1984), available at http://fraser.stlouisfed
.org/historicaldocs/678/download/66199/19840917_hr_finperfci.pdf.
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portfolio. Indeed, in the case of both default probabilities and LGD, a
significant amount of empirical evidence indicates that both tend to
increase during economic downturns, suggesting the need to revisit
our assumption that we have correctly estimated these parameters
159
using historical data.
Figure 5, for instance, illustrates the consequence on the C&I
loan portfolio used previously if we stress both the default probability
and LGD. The first, highest line represents the (unstressed) results of
Simulation 4 reported previously in Figure 4. The second highest line
shows the results of rerunning Simulation 4 but increasing the default
probability from 1.0% (approximately the average default rate for BB
rated bonds) 160 to 1.9% (approximately a one standard deviation
increase in the BB default rate).' 6' As Figure 5 reveals, doing so
increased 99.9% credit VaR by over $200 million to approximately
$1.75 billion. In the case of LGD, the fact that the portfolio had a
significant energy concentration would suggest the need for an even
greater stress given evidence that recovery rates for energy-related
loans decline in adverse market conditions. 62 For purposes of the
stress, Simulation 4 was therefore rerun, setting LGD equal to the
average LGD and variance for senior unsecured bonds. 63 The third
line indicates that modifying Simulation 4 in this manner had an
especially dramatic consequence on potential loan losses, increasing
the 99.9% VaR estimate to $3.5 billion. And if both modifications were
made to Simulation 4, the consequences were even more dire still,
with the loss estimate at 99.9% confidence rising to over $4 billion. To
the extent the unstressed model above caused our hypothetical
analyst concern, these stressed versions would presumably be all the

159. See, e.g., Fabien Couderc et al., Business and Financial Indicators: What Are the
Determinants of Default Probability Changes?, in CREDIT RISK: MODELS, DERIVATIVES, AND
MANAGEMENT 235, 247-54 (Niklas Wagner ed. 2008) (showing that default probability changes
are the joint effects of past and subsequent economic trends); Viral Acharya et al.,
Understanding the Recovery Rates on Defaulted Securities 19-25 (Sept. 2003), available at
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/department/Seminar/2003FalY/Micro/acharya-microl 1l303.pdf
(finding that industry conditions at the time of default are important determinants of recovery
rates).
160. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 132, at 17 tbl. 12, 18 tbl. 14.
161. See id.
162. See Acharya et al., supra note 159, at 23 (finding that borrowers across a number of
industries (including energy) experience a significant drop in their debt recoveries when the
borrowers' industry is in distress relative to the industry's nondistress setting).
163. According to S&P, senior unsecured bonds had an average recovery rate of 42.6% and a
standard deviation of 34.8%. See STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 132, at 26 tbl.17.
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more reason for her to question whether $1.8 billion was sufficient
capital for the bank to survive a stressed environment.
FIGURE 5: DISTRIBUTION OF PORTFOLIO LOSSES UNDER
STRESSED CONDITIONS
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Thus, while estimating the credit risk of a loan portfolio can be
done with considerably more accuracy, even the basic modeling
technique used here can provide a starting point for assessing a loan
portfolio's overall risk. Moreover, the fact that it was done with such a
limited amount of information confirms the possibility that leveraging
credit modeling technology may indeed be a means to facilitate
portfolio analysis while averting the disclosure of proprietary position
data. Yet, while this conclusion appears appropriate for analyzing a
traditional loan portfolio like CINB's, it remains to be seen whether
such a disclosure regime can be effective in the more complex world of
finance revealed by the Financial Crisis. It is to that more challenging
issue that we now turn.
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B. Citigroup
1. Background
As is well known, the Financial Crisis of 2008 represents one of
the most significant economic crises since the Great Depression. It
also represents one of the most complex given that so many different
types of institutions were ensnared by the panic that spread
throughout the financial system for most of 2008 and 2009. In many
ways, the situation resembled a straightforward banking crisis having
a number of similarities with the failure of CINB. From January 2008
through December 2009, data from the FDIC reveal that 165 U.S.
banks failed, 164 representing one of the most significant periods of
bank closures in U.S. history. Moreover, the story that routinely
emerges from the postmortem reports of these institutions is
remarkably familiar in light of CINB's experience: significant losses
produced by concentrated real estate portfolios induced wholesale
lenders to flee for better capitalized institutions. 165 These similarities
with CINB's collapse underscore the continuing importance of the
basic credit portfolio analysis illustrated previously.
Yet, while commercial bank failures no doubt contributed to
market instability, they were in many ways a sideshow to the main
attraction of the financial turmoil of 2008: the teetering of some of the
world's largest financial institutions. Like the banking failures, the
source of these institutions' instability also arose from the credit risk
embedded in their real estate investments, but the manifestation of
these losses proved considerably more complex-and ultimately, more
significant-than the simple default risk that has traditionally
bedeviled banks' loan portfolios. In particular, the credit risk that

164. See Failed Bank List, FDIC, http://www.fdic'govlbanklindividual/failedlbanklist.html
(last visited Jan. 27, 2012).
165. From January 2009 through September 2010, the FDIC Office of the Inspector General
published seventy-one Material Loss Reviews ('MLRs") analyzing instances where the FDIC
incurred a material loss (defined as a loss greater than $25 million) due to a bank closure.
Material Loss and In-Depth Reviews, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
http://www.fdicoig.gov/mlr.shtml. In sixty-six of the MLRs (93%), the Inspector General
attributed a bank's failure to its heavy concentration of either commercial real estate ("CRE") or
residential acquisition, development, and construction ("ADC") lending. Fifty-one of the MLRs
additionally faulted a bank for relying on "volatile," noncore funding sources such as brokered
deposits. See also Sarah Woo, Micro-Prudence, Macro-Risk: Where FinancialRegulation Meets
Bankruptcy 9 (Oct. 22, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn
.corrlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1639606 ("[Clonstruction and development loans constitute by
far one of the most significant drivers of commercial bank failures.").
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proved toxic to firms ranging from Bear Stearns to AIG to Citigroup
came in the form of structured credit exposures that were perceived to
be considerably less risky than the real estate loans that were
166
defaulting in large numbers in the portfolios of commercial banks.
Exposure to bonds issued by CDOs backed by residential
mortgages proved especially problematic for these firms. 167 Through
securitization, an investment bank could form a CDO to acquire a
portfolio of loans from one or more loan originators, the funds for
which would be raised through the CDO's issuance of multiple
tranches of notes to institutional investors. Moreover, because the
basic building blocks of a CDO consisted of contractually allocating
interest and principal payments to the various tranches, any type of
credit instrument could be acquired. This led to the development of
CDOs built with not only commercial and residential mortgages, but
even other CDOs and synthetic credit instruments using credit default
swaps. Between 2003 and 2007, nearly $700 billion of CDOs were
created, most holding some percentage of mortgage-backed securities
168
as collateral.
For banks underwriting the issuance of a CDO, the method by
which its notes were structured often resulted in the underwriting
bank retaining a significant portion of the CDO's most senior notes. In
general, the basic structure of a CDO was to allocate expected credit
losses from the underlying portfolio to the more junior CDO notes (for
which their holders would be paid a correspondingly higher rate of
return). 169 Moreover, as the foregoing discussion of credit risk might
suggest, expected losses for a standard portfolio of loans in a CDO
would generally represent just a fraction of the total portfolio's value.
The consequence was that for the most senior tranche of CDO notes,
the attachment point in the CDO structure-or the percentage of the
portfolio that had to be wiped out before the senior notes suffered any
loss-could be quite low. Indeed, anywhere from 70% to 90% of a
CDO's capital structure was often deemed by credit rating agencies to
be safer than even AAA-rated corporate debt, 70 causing the most

166. See infra text accompanying note 241.
167. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 129 (2011)

[hereinafter FCIC REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdfIGPOFCIC.pdf ("In the end, CDOs turned out to be some of the most ill-fated assets in the financial
crisis.").
168. Id.
169. See HULL, supra note 17, at 337-38.
170. See id. at 339.
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senior CDO notes to generally be dubbed the "super senior" tranche.
At the same time, the fact that a CDO could have more than a billion
dollars of underlying loans left the underwriting bank with the
challenge of finding a market for these large, low-yielding notes.
In the end, many banks simply retained the super senior
tranches on their balance sheets, 171 occasionally obtaining insurance
on any potential losses from insurers such as AIG or monoline
insurance companies. 172 While the notional amounts of these positions
were large, it was an article of faith among firms exposed to super
senior notes that they posed extremely low default risk. For instance,
as late as December 2007, Martin Sullivan, AIG's chief executive
officer, confirmed the firm's large exposure to super senior CDO
tranches but stressed the low credit risk they posed: "Because this
business is carefully underwritten and structured with very high
attachment points to the multiples of expected losses, we believe the
173
probability that it will sustain an economic loss is close to zero."
The problem with this perspective, however, was that it
ignored the different ways in which credit risk can affect a financial
institution. So far, the discussion of credit risk has largely proceeded
on the assumption that the principal risk of loss arises from an actual
default-an assumption that is entirely appropriate for examining a
bank's held-to-maturity loan portfolio. The reason is that for most
commercial banks, accounting standards and bank regulatory
authorities generally require institutions to report held-to-maturity
loans at historical cost until default or repayment, less any deduction
for probable losses. 174 In a world where credit is held to maturity,
Sullivan's statement would thus have considerable support: so long as
the institution reasonably believes a super senior note has a low
probability of actual default, it would pose very little risk on a
company's balance sheet.
In contrast, this conclusion changes when credit instruments
are held for trading purposes rather than held to maturity. Like any
financial asset, credit instruments can be traded to capture price

171. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 167, at 129.
172. See id. at 139-42 (describing AIG swaps); id. at 276-78 (describing monoline swaps).
173. American International Group Investor Meeting-Final, FD (FAIR DISCLOSURE) WIRE,
Dec. 5, 2007, at 4 [hereinafter AIG Investor Meeting] (statement of Martin Sullivan); see also
FCIC REPORT, supra note 167, at 266 ('The mantra at [AIG Financial Products] had always been
...that there could never be losses.") (quoting Joseph St. Denis).
174. See Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, Did Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the
FinancialCrisis?,24 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 98-99 (2010).
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movements in the relevant trading market with the firm holding the
asset recording a profit or loss in its income statement based on the
asset's current change in value. 175 And in the case of most financial
institutions, a considerable portion of their exposure to super senior
CDOs was held in trading positions subject to mark-to-market
accounting. 176 In the case of insurers such as AIG and financial
guarantee companies, for instance, their most critical exposures to
subprime debt were in the form of credit default swaps ("CDS") the
firms had written to cover any loss of principal on the senior-most
tranche of securities issued by multisector CDOs. Even though the
CDS contracts would only be triggered on a default of the underlying
CDO, the contracts constituted derivatives under Statement of
Financial Accounting Standards ("SFAS") No. 133.177 As such, changes
in their fair value were required to be recorded on the insurers' income
statements as unrecognized gain or loss in each accounting period,
while their aggregate fair value was to be recorded on the balance
78
sheet as a derivative liability.'
Likewise in the case of financial institutions such as Citigroup
and Merrill Lynch, exposures to CDOs backed by subprime mortgages
were often held in the firms' trading accounts where they were subject
to mark-to-market accounting. 179 Although the market for these
securities was extremely thin, the regulatory capital requirements
that applied to financial institutions through 2008 created significant
incentives for firms to maintain that these securities were being held

175. Id. at 99. A bank's "trading assets" represent a distinct category of financial assets
under GAAP. Under SFAS 115, a bank's trading assets comprise instruments that are bought
and held principally for the purpose of selling them in the near term. Id.
176. See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING

MARKET AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 14 (2008), available at www.financialstabilityboard
.org/publications/r_0804.pdf ("A large proportion of structured credit products are held in banks'
and securities firms' trading books .... ").
177. See ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTITIES, Statement of

Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1998) (outlining
accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments).
178. Id.; see also WALLACE ENMAN, MOODY'S INVESTORS SERV., INC., REP. NO. 105498,
SPECIAL COMMENT: INTERPRETING FINANCIAL GUARANTORS' MARK-TO-MARKET LOSSES (2008),

available at http://www.ambac.com/pdfsRA/Moodys/07-2008.pdf (analyzing insurers' mark-tomarket losses arising from CDS written on multisector CDOs).
179. See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 167, at 382-83 (noting Merrill Lynch's treatment of
CDOs). Citigroup's treatment of its CDOs is discussed infra text accompanying note 239; UBS
AG,

SHAREHOLDER

REPORT
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UBS'S

WRITE-DOWNS

www.ubs.com/l/ShowMedia/.../agm?...080418ShareholderReport.pdf
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with trading intent and thus eligible for trading book treatment.180 In
particular, the capital requirements that applied to most financial
institutions drew a sharp distinction between capital that must be
held against an institution's "trading book" and capital held against
its "banking book."18 1 Most notably, under both U.S. banking
regulations and the Basel Accords, larger banks that had wellestablished risk management protocols were permitted to determine
the amount of regulatory capital for trading book assets using an
"internal model-based approach." 18 2 Under this approach, a bank
would set regulatory capital for its trading book based on an estimate
of the worst trading (or "market") loss that could be expected from its
trading assets over a ten-day period with 99% confidence.18 3 In
contrast, the regulatory capital requirements that applied to the same
firm's "banking book" required it to set aside capital to cover banking
book assets based on an estimate of the worst portfolio credit losses
184
that could be expected over a one-year period with 99.9% confidence.
Since this latter calculation commonly exceeded the capital required
for a CDO's market-based risk,1 8 5 assigning CDO securities to the
trading book could lead to a significant reduction in regulatory
capital-a point repeatedly emphasized by financial firms in their own
advisory work with other banks.186 The end result was the significant
growth of many firms' trading books during the mid-2000s, fueled in
part by the retention of the senior notes of CDOs. Figure 6, for
instance, reflects the rapid growth of trading assets at Citigroup
where they rose from $120 billion at the end of 1998 to $580 billion by
180. See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 176, at 14 ("Where market risk capital measures
do not fully capture the credit risk of these products, there is a regulatory arbitrage incentive to
reduce capital requirements by holding such exposures in the trading book.").
181. See HULL, supra note 17, at 229 (describing trading book and banking book capital
requirements).
182. Id. Basel's market risk approach was implemented for U.S. banking institutions in
1996. See Risk-Based Capital Standards: Market Risk, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,358 (Sept. 6, 1996).
183. See HULL, supra note 17, at 229.
184. See id. at 234. Through the Financial Crisis, banks that did not qualify to use the
internal model-based approach were required to hold capital to cover both their trading books
and their banking books using a standardized approach that assigned capital charges to specific
categories of assets (e.g., equity securities vs. investment-grade debt securities vs. unrated debt
securities). See id. at 229, 232-33.
185. See FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 176, at 14.
186. See, e.g., CITIGROUP, INC., CREDIT DERIVATIVES 2001-ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES 7
(2001) (emphasizing that if collateralized notes are held in the trading book rather than the
banking book the "originating bank obtains [regulatory capital] relief under the market risk
rule."); JOHN HUNT ET AL., LEHMAN BROS., BANK STRATEGIES:
OBLIGATIONS AND CREDIT DERIVATIVES 27 (1999) (same).
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the third quarter of 2007.187 In contrast, the amount of regulatory
capital Citigroup was required to hold against these assets was but a
18 8
small fraction of their notional amount.
FIGURE 6: GROWTH OF CITIGROUP'S TRADING BOOK VS.
REGULATORY CAPITAL FOR MARKET RISK, 1999-2007
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Having built such large CDO positions in their trading books,
financial firms were required to take extraordinarily large mark-tomarket losses on them once the housing market began to deteriorate
in 2007.189 In particular, rising delinquency and default rates among
subprime borrowers during the summer of 2007 prompted a general

187. Data for Figure 6 was taken from the Bank Regulatory Database provided through
Wharton Research Data Services. Data for the database was obtained from Citigroup's Form Y9C reports. See Citigroup, Inc., Form Y-9C, supra note 18.
188. Regulatory capital was based on Citigroup's reported "market risk equivalent assets"
set forth in its Form Y-9C. A bank's risk-weighted assets ("RWA") for market risk are defined as
12.5 times the market risk capital determined from its internal-based model. See HULL, supra
note 17, at 230. Therefore, Citigroup's market risk capital was calculated by dividing Citigroup's
market risk equivalent assets by 12.5.
189. FCIC REPORT, supra note 167, at 256 (discussing significant losses in 2007 among U.S.
financial institutions due to their CDO holdings).
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reassessment of any securities backed by subprime mortgages. 190 At
the same time, CDOs issued in 2005 through 2007 had increasingly
been structured to purchase mortgage-backed securities. By 2007,
more than half of all outstanding CDOs were believed to be
"structured finance CDOs" composed of residential mortgage-backed
securities ("RMBS") and other asset-backed securities (often including
tranches of other CDOs). 191 Of course, the structural protections of a
CDO were designed to minimize the risk that losses experienced in the
underlying RMBS would flow through to the senior tranches of a CDO
held by most financial institutions. However, for a senior CDO tranche
subject to mark-to-market accounting, the rising expectation of losses
within a CDO's portfolio (even if localized in the CDO's junior
tranches) would seem to demand some valuation adjustment given the
tranche's diminished subordination protection.
Because CDO tranches rarely traded, 192 quantifying this
valuation adjustment hinged on modeling the expected cash flows and
default probabilities of the underlying securities. 193 Moreover, in the
case of a CDO backed by subprime RMBS, the underlying collateral
also rarely traded, thus complicating further the estimation of the
securities' default probabilities.1 94 Such challenges were, in part, a key
reason for the development of the ABX.HE indices in 2006.195 In
general, the indices tracked the value of CDS written on a designated
list of twenty subprime RMBS transactions, with each index limited to
the CDS written on one of their five investment grade tranches

190. See generally id. at 214-29 (detailing collapse in the markets for subprime-linked
securities).
191. See, e.g., ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., SUBPRIME AND SYNTHETIC CDOS: STRUCTURE, RISK,

AND VALUATION 4 (2010), available at http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUBCDOsStructure_
RiskValuation_0610.pdf.
192. See, e.g., Citigroup, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 169 (Feb. 22, 2008) [hereinafter
Citigroup
2007
10-K
Report],
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data
/831001/000119312508036445/dl0k.htm#fin69414_- 69 (noting that prior to the third quarter of
2007, "the secondary market for CDO super senior subprime tranches was extremely limited").
193. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 191, at 24-25 (describing procedure for valuing

CDOs).
194. Id. As discussed previously, reduced form models can be used to derive a default
probability from the market price of a credit instrument. See supra text accompanying note 82.
In the absence of market prices for subprime RMBS, default probabilities would have to be
estimated using historical data such as past loan performance data, which may be slow to
capture changes in the economy. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 191, at 24-25.
195. The ABX.HE index was among a larger family of credit and structured finance indices
that are administered by Markit Group Limited. See Indices Overview, MARKIT,
http://www.markit.com/en/products/data/indices/indices.page? (last visited Oct. 17, 2011).
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ranging from AAA to BBB-.196 Once the indices began trading, the
price of each index could therefore be used to calculate credit spreads
for each of the five tranches, which in turn, could be used to infer
default probabilities for the RMBS tranche underlying the index.197 To
the extent these RMBS tranches resembled the securities in a
particular CDO, these default estimates could then be used to value
the securities of a CDO, an outcome that was encouraged by fair value
accounting rules. 198 As a result of these developments, by early 2007,
both investors and financial institutions were regularly using the
ABX.HE indices to value subprime-linked CDOs. 199

196. The same twenty RMBS transactions serve as the reference entities for the CDS that
make up the indices for a single vintage and do not change over the life of the index. BUCKBERG
ET AL., supra note 191, at 18. Thus, the first index-the 2006-1 vintage released in January
2006-had five indices that were all based on five different tranches of the same twenty RMBS
deals. To accommodate the fact that RMBS transactions change over time, a new index was
therefore constructed semi-annually comprised of a new sample of twenty transactions issued
within the prior six months of the release date. In all, four vintages of indices were introduced,
each covering twenty RMBS transactions issued in the last half of 2005 through the first half of
2007. No new indices were introduced following the decline in the value of the indices after the
first half of 2007. Id.
197. See id. at 25; see also John C. Hull & Alan White, Valuing Credit Default Swaps I: No
Counterparty Default Risk, 8 J. DERIVATIVES 29, 29-40 (2000) (describing the method for
converting spreads into default probabilities).
198. Assets subject to fair value accounting-such as trading book assets-must be valued in
accordance with SFAS 157, which sets forth the procedure for determining an asset's fair value.
See Laux & Leuz, supra note 174, at 96-97. In general, SFAS 157 expresses a strong preference
for fair value to be based on quoted prices from transactions or dealers in active markets ("Level
1" inputs) where they are available. Id. at 97. In the absence of market prices, fair value must be
determined using models that are required to use observable inputs ("Level 2"), which include
quoted prices for similar assets and other relevant market data such as market prices of an
appropriate index. Id. Unobservable inputs, typically model assumptions, can be used if
observable inputs are unavailable ("Level 3"). Id.
199. See, e.g., KEVIN MCGOVERN & BRIAN SCIACCA, CDO PRICE VERIFICATION POLICY &
PROCEDURE (Lehman Brothers Internal Document) 4 (2008), available at http://www.jenner
.comlehmanldocs/debtors/LBHISEC07940_4228806-4228809.pdf ("ABS CDO's can be priced off
ABX Tranches by implying that residential mortgage collateral are valued at the ABX tranche
with the same credit rating."); October Year to Date Trading Performance at Barclays Capital
Ahead of Record Prior Year Period, BARCLAYS PLC, (Nov. 15, 2007), http://www.newsroom
.barclays.co.uklimagelibrary/downloadMedia.ashx?MediaDetailsD=
5424 (same); see also Gary B. Gorton, The Panic of 2007, at 131, 212 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan.
City Symposium, Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System, 2008), available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2O08/Gorton.03.12.09.pdf ("Once the ABX indices
started to drift downwards, accountants required market participants to use these indices for
mark-to-market purposes . . . . ); Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, The Bear's Lair: Indexed
Credit Default Swaps and the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 2 (Fisher Ctr. for Real Estate & Urban
Econ., Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=1434686 ("[M]any portfolio
investors in subprime mortgage securities are using the more liquid ABX.HE prices as a
benchmark for marking-to-market their portfolios of subprime securities.").
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The challenge for financial institutions holding CDOs, however,
was that the very liquidity that made the ABX.HE appropriate for
pricing subprime credit risk also made it attractive for purposes of

hedging and trading

it.200

With the increase in subprime delinquency

and default rates in 2007, the index became a primary means for
market participants to express a negative view of subprime credit risk
as well as for financial institutions to hedge their subprime
exposures. 20 1 As shown in Figure 7, by the autumn of 2007, demand
for subprime protection had resulted in a precipitous drop in the price
of the ABX.HE among all investment grade tranches. While
subsequent research would strongly suggest that much of this drop
was the product of liquidity-driven hedging and trading, 20 2 the
significant drop nevertheless indicated a substantial fall in the value
of the CDO positions residing in the trading books of financial
institutions. 20 3 By the end of 2007, financial firms who had only a year
earlier been reporting record net profits found themselves reporting
extraordinary losses from CDO write-downs. At Citigroup, for
instance, deterioration in the value of its CDO portfolio led the firm to
make its November 4, 2007 announcement of between $8 billion and
20 5
$10 billion of CDO-related losses, 20 4 or 10% of its 2007 revenue.
Likewise, at AIG, declining values of the CDOs it had insured led to
both its announcement of a net loss of $8.4 billion for the fourth
quarter of 2007 as well as the initial collateral calls that would

200. See BUCKBERG ET AL., supra note 191, at 18 ('These Markit indices are not merely data
series that track constituents over time-they also underlie tradable OTC contracts used by
broker-dealers and other market participants to hedge, speculate, and trade.").
201. See Gorton, supra note 199, at 207-08.
202. See Stanton & Wallace, supranote 199, at 3-4 (finding that under modest assumptions,
the ABX.HE prices in 2009 implied default rates of 100% of the underlying RMBS).
203. Not surprisingly, the collapse of ABX prices naturally led institutions to argue against
using the index as a benchmark for pricing their subprime exposure. See, e.g., AIG Investor
Meeting, supra note 173 (statement of Joe Cassano) ("Why don't we use the ABX? I think the
short answer is the ABX is not at all in any way representative of our portfolio."). Indeed, as the
Financial Crisis worsened, financial institutions attempted to utilize the limited flexibility under
SFAS 157 to price mortgage-related securities using Level 3 rather than Level 2 inputs. See
Laux & Leuz, supra note 174, at 107-09 (finding that "net transfers into the Level 3 category
were substantial" with many institutions making substantial transfers in the fourth quarter of
2007).
204. Citigroup, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 5, 2007), available at http://www.sec.
gov/Archivesledgar/data83lO00
31001110465907079495/0001 104659-07-079495-index.htm.
205. See Citigroup 2007 10-K Report, supra note 192, at 4 (noting 2007 revenue of $81.7
billion).
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lead to the insurer's demise. 206 In the process, the firms
how debt securities that pose only minimal credit risk to a
balance sheet can produce market risks capable of
the firms.
FIGURE 7: PRICING OF ABX.HE
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2. Modeling Citigroup's Portfolio Risk
As the foregoing discussion of the Financial Crisis might
suggest, the complex interaction of events in 2007 and 2008
complicated attempts to anticipate the losses that would ultimately
result from a portfolio of subprime-linked CDOs. After all, realized
losses from CDOs were a product of both their underlying credit risk
as well as dynamics within the financial markets (such as liquiditydriven pricing of the ABX.HE) that were unlikely to have been
anticipated. As with CINB, however, even with their limitations,
many of the same credit modeling techniques discussed previously
could have nevertheless highlighted financial firms' significant
exposure to credit risk as they built large, unhedged trading portfolios
of CDO notes. Indeed, similar to the experience of CINB, the primary

206. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 34 (Feb. 28, 2008), available at http://
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/5272/000095012308002280/y44393elOvk.htm
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challenge to analyzing a firm's exposure to credit risk was not
developing a sufficiently sophisticated model but rather having access
to the same basic parameter estimates used to analyze CINB's
hypothetical C&I portfolio. The following analysis of Citigroup's CDO
portfolio provides an illustration.
As in the case of CINB, the near failure of Citigroup in 2008
ultimately produced a considerable amount of information concerning
the investments at the heart of the institution's turmoil. In contrast to
the congressional investigation of CINB, details concerning Citigroup's
CDO portfolio arose primarily as a result of private securities
litigation initiated against Citigroup in 2008.207 The litigation, which
alleged that Citigroup failed to disclose its exposure to subprimebacked securities prior to its press release on November 4, 2007,
revealed a number of details concerning the firm's CDO portfolio.
Among other things, the litigation provided an itemized list of the fifty
positions that comprised Citigroup's $43.9 billion portfolio of CDOs
along with their date of issuance. 208 It also confirmed (as did
Citigroup's 2007 Form 10-K) that each of these positions represented
the senior-most debt securities of the CDOs and were originally rated
20 9
AAA upon issuance.
With this basic information in hand, assessing the risk of
Citigroup's CDO portfolio prior to the Financial Crisis proceeded by
means of constructing a hypothetical portfolio risk model in much the
same manner that was done in the previous analysis of CINB. As with
the prior analysis, the overall objective of the model was to provide a
forecast of the potential losses Citigroup might suffer over a specified
time horizon on account of the credit risk embedded in its CDO
portfolio. In keeping with both industry practice 2 10 and Citigroup's
207. See Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753
F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Nos. 09 MD 2070 (SHS), 07 Civ. 9901 (SHS), 07 Civ. 10258
(SHS), 08 Civ. 135 (SHS), 08 Civ. 136 (SHS)) [hereinafter Citigroup Complaint].
208. See id. at 56-77.
209. Id.; Citigroup 2007 10-K Report, supra note 192, at 91. Citigroup appears to have
treated these positions as AAA-rated assets until sometime during the third quarter of 2008. Id.
at 169. The $43.9 billion excludes an additional $9.5 billion Citigroup held but had hedged with
monoline insurers. Citigroup Complaint, supra note 207, at 76-77.
210. See, e.g., J.P. MORGAN & CO. INC., CREDITMETRICS-TECHNICAL DOCUMENT 32 (1997)

[hereinafter CREDITMETRICS TECHNICAL DOCUMENT] (noting that "using as a convention a one
year risk horizon [for market risk] . . . is common"); THE JOINT FORUM, BASEL COMM. ON
BANKING SUPERVISION, TRENDS IN RISK INTEGRATION AND AGGREGATION 32 (2003), available at

http://www.bis.org/publ/joint07.pdf (noting that banks typically calculate market VaR over a few
trading days but then convert this measure to a one-year measure for VaR to calculate their
economic capital). In theory, a portfolio model designed to examine the risk of trading assets
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own disclosed risk management policy, 211 a one-year time horizon was
once again utilized. July 1, 2007, was selected as the measurement
date to enable analysis of Citigroup's portfolio after it had already
accumulated most of its CDO positions but prior to its cessation of
CDO structuring. Indeed, in early July 2007, Citigroup was either in
the process of marketing or of preparing to market an additional $5.5
billion of CDOs, of which $4.2 billion would end up in its trading
2 12
book.
In contrast to the model used for CINB (which focused on the
credit risk within CINB's banking book), the fact that Citigroup held
its CDO positions as part of its trading book required a slightly
different analysis than used previously. In particular, whereas the
primary concern with CINB's loan portfolio was how loan defaults
might affect the bank's balance sheet, holding debt securities as part
of a trading portfolio raises the additional risk that the securities
might decline in value even in the absence of outright defaults. For
instance, even if a borrower does not actually default on its debt
obligations, a deterioration of the borrower's credit quality
nevertheless makes the cash flows on its debt obligations more risky
and, as a consequence, subject to a greater pricing discount.
Accounting for this market risk thus called for several modifications to
the modeling approach used previously, which, in keeping with
traditional risk analysis of banking books, examined only whether a
loan was in default as of the end of the forecast period.
For purposes of conducting this additional market analysis, I
turned to a common modeling technique originally pioneered by
JPMorgan in its widely used CreditMetrics portfolio model. 213 In
general, CreditMetrics accounts for potential changes in the value of
debt securities by relying on the well-established relationship between
might be designed to examine losses over a period less than a year where the trading assets
represent highly liquid securities. See, e.g., MICHEL CROUHY ET AL., THE ESSENTIALS OF RISK
MANAGEMENT 374 (2006) (noting that "[iln the case of a proprietary trading desk, with highly
liquid positions and no clients to service ... risk reduction can take place very quickly indeed").
For purposes of the model, the liquidity of super senior CDO securities-which was limited even

before 2007, see supra text accompanying note 192-was assumed to have largely evaporated by
July 2007.
211. See infra text accompanying note 251 (describing Citigroup's economic capital
calculation).
212. The CDOs consisted of Pinnacle Peak CDO I (closed on July 3, 2007), Bonifacius (closed
on July 27, 2007) and Jupiter High Grade CDO VII (closed on August 2, 2007). See Citigroup
Complaint, supranote 207, at 73.
213. See generally CREDITMETRICS

TECHNICAL DOCUMENT,

(providing overview of CreditMetrics methodology).

supra note

210, at

5-21
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credit ratings and credit spreads. 214 As initially outlined by JPMorgan,
the fact that debt markets systematically demand higher yields on
lower-rated bonds provides a straightforward means to estimate the
value of nondefaulted debt obligations. In particular, to the extent a
debt obligation is upgraded or downgraded, its value should reflect the
present value of its anticipated cash flows (e.g., interest and principal
payments) discounted at the yields for similarly rated debt
instruments. For any bond that has not defaulted, estimating its
market value for a future period thus becomes an exercise of
estimating its credit rating and the discount rate that should be
associated with it.215
Following this logic, an important step in designing Citigroup's
CDO portfolio model was estimating the one-year credit rating for
each position. As in CreditMetrics, the model accomplished this
estimation using two procedures. The first was to rely on historical
migration rates of rated debt to estimate the probability that debt
with a given rating will migrate to another rating category within one
year. 21 6 Table 4, for instance, provides the historical one-year
transition rates for rated debt between 1981 and 2005.217 As the table
indicates, rated debt tends to retain the same rating after one year's
time, although significant migrations can occur in all rating categories
including a migration to default ("D"). Of course, future transition
rates might differ significantly from these historic averages, but the
CreditMetrics approach makes the simplifying assumption that
migration rates over the next year will largely conform to these
historic patterns. 218 In the Citigroup model, each position in its
portfolio was therefore assumed to have a twelve-month migration
probability equivalent to the rates set forth in Table 4. For debt
initially rated AAA, for example, using this assumption suggested that
after one year there would be a 91.39% probability the debt would
remain AAA, a 7.95% probability it would migrate to AA, and a
0.001% probability it would default.
214. Id. at 10.
215. Id. at 9-10.
216. Id. at 24-25.
217. STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 132, at 14. Standard & Poor's also tracks issuers who
transition from a rating to "not rated." The procedure for adjusting the transition matrix to
isolate only those transitions from one rating to another rating is described in LFFLER & POSCH,
supra note 79, at 88-89.
218. CREDITMETRICS TECHNICAL DOCUMENT, supra note 210, at 49 ("[W]e assume that the
transition process is stationary in that the same transition matrix is valid from one year to
another.").
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TABLE 4: ONE-YEAR TRANSITION RATES FOR RATED DEBT
To:

AAA

AA

A

BBB

BB

B

CCC

D

AAA
AA

91.39%
0.60%

7.95%
90.65

0.51%
7.94%

0.09%
0.60%

0.06%
0.06%

0.00%
0.11%

0.00%
0.02%

0.001%
0.01%

A

0.05%

1.99%

90.43

6.86%

0.44%

0.16%

0.03%

0.04%

BBB

0.02%

0.17%

4.11%

89.85

4.56%

0.81%

0.18%

0.29%

BB

0.03%

0.04%

0.28%

5.80%

83.51%

8.11%

0.99%

1.23%

B
CCC

0.00%
0.00%

0.00%
0.00%

0.22%
0.32%

0.35%
0.47%

6.25%
1.43%

82.33%
13.56%

4.77%
54.14%

6.09%
30.08%

Having determined the migration probabilities for each debt
position, the second step of the model was a Monte Carlo procedure
that simulated the one-year credit migration for all positions in the
portfolio several thousand times. 219 As with simulating defaults in the
CINB loan portfolio, a key challenge for the model was addressing the
possibility of correlated behavior-in this case, correlated migrations
as well as defaults. To account for this issue, the same structural
approach to default used for the CINB model was used to simulate
correlated asset values for each position based on equation (1) or, as
discussed below, equation (2). The primary difference in the Citigroup
model was that the model now had to evaluate a borrower's future
asset value against the full range of rating possibilities, as opposed to
simply a single default state. In keeping with the CreditMetrics
approach, this latter task was accomplished by mapping each
simulated asset value to a particular rating category (including
default) using the probability estimates obtained from the transition
220
matrix.
219. Id. at 113 (describing the Monte Carlo procedure used in CreditMetrics).
220. Id. at 113-116. More specifically, each predicted asset value was mapped to a particular
rating category by means of converting each rating probability in the transition matrix to a value
within the cumulative distribution function for either a standard normal or a t-distributed
random variable, as applicable. See LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 144-45 (describing
methodology). For instance, if asset values were generated using a standard normal distribution,
a default was deemed to occur if the asset value fell below a default threshold (D) defined as the
inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution of the default probability set forth in the
transaction matrix for the borrower's initial rating. For asset values greater than the applicable
default threshold, the issuer was assigned a nondefault rating grade k by applying the inverse of
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The final step in designing Citigroup's portfolio model was
estimating in each simulation the debt security's present value in one
year's time in order to calculate the portfolio's value. 221 For simplicity,
each CDO position was assumed to pay interest at a fixed rate of
5.50% per year (approximately the average yield on AAA-rated debt on
June 30, 2007) and to have a maturity of five years. For each position,
these five years of cash flows were then discounted using estimates of
the term structure of interest rates for the future rating category the
simulator predicted for the position. Following CreditMetrics, all
estimated term structures were based on the one-year forward rates
that existed on June 30, 2007, using data obtained from Bloomberg
and Bondsonline. 222 In cases where a debt position was predicted to
default in a simulation, Citigroup was assumed to recover 50% of the
principal balance on June 30, 2008.223
The end result of this process was a market-sensitive portfolio
model that was used to assess the credit risk in Citigroup's portfolio of
CDOs. As with the model used for CINB, the model was run four
separate times (100,000 simulations each) to examine the effect of
using different assumptions concerning the portfolio's structure. The
first, most basic set of simulations (Simulation 1) assumed the $43.9
billion of CDO securities was evenly distributed among 439 AAA-rated
positions of $100 million each. Asset values for each position were
the standard normal cumulative distribution to the cumulative probability of moving into grade
k or a lower grade (including default). For instance, for a bond with an initial rating of "A,"
applying this procedure would yield the following rating thresholds after one year assuming
asset values were normally distributed:
To:
AAA
n

AA
3.28

A
2.04

BBB
-1.44

BB
-2.47

B
-2.83

CCC
-3.18

D
-3.35

Assuming the simulation drew an asset value of -2.5, the debt would then be assigned a rating of
"BB" after one year. In contrast, if the simulation drew an asset value of -3.00, the debt would be
assigned to a rating of "B."
221. CREDITMETRICS TECHNICAL DOCUMENT, supra note 210, at 27-28.
222. Id. at 28. More precisely, estimations of one-year forward curves were first obtained by
calculating the one-year forward risk-free curve using the credit curve for U.S. Treasury STRIPS
obtained from Bloomberg. Estimations of forward curves for each rating category were then
obtained by adding to these figures the appropriate spread for the rating category as of June 30,
2007, using the bond spreads provided by Bondsonline. The methodology is discussed in more
detail in SAUNDERS &ALLEN, supranote 90, at 195-200.
223. See JAN KREGEL, LEVY ECON. INST. OF BARD COLL., MINSKY'S CUSHIONS OF SAFETY:
SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE CRISIS IN THE U.S. SUBPRIME MORTGAGE MARKET 13 (2008). Because the

results below were driven primarily from rating migrations rather than defaults, simulated
trading losses did not change materially upon using different recovery rates.
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then modeled using the one-factor structural model discussed
previously, assuming normally distributed asset values. For purposes
of assessing the effect of correlated migrations within the portfolio, all
positions were assumed to have a factor correlation of 22.7%-the
224
same figure used in the first simulation of CINB's portfolio.
Although the average exposure amount and correlation assumptions
misrepresent the true CDO portfolio, they might represent reasonable
assumptions to make had Citigroup disclosed simply the fact that it
had a $43.9 billion portfolio of AAA-rated bonds.
As with the second set of simulations for CINB, the next set of
simulations (Simulation 2) focused on changing the distributional
assumption for Ai. In particular, rather than assume the systematic
factor Z and each issuer's idiosyncratic factor Ei were normally
distributed, the model was modified so that each factor came from a
Student t-distribution with three degrees of freedom. Using this
225
assumption produced a multivariate Student t-distribution for Ai,
which was intended to produce greater migration and default
dependencies among obligors.
The final two simulations focused on the effect of obtaining two
additional pieces of information concerning Citigroup's CDO portfolio.
In contrast to the first two simulations, the third set (Simulation 3)
was run with knowledge that the $43.9 billion of AAA-rated securities
actually represented a portfolio of notes issued by CDOs. In reality,
the additional complexity of modeling structured-finance notes would
most likely merit a substantially more complicated credit model, 226 but
for present purposes, I assumed an analyst would adopt the practice
(not uncommon in 2007)227 of analyzing them using the structural
model of default. 228 As with CINB, this additional knowledge could
224. See supra tbl.1.
225. See supra text accompanying note 149.
226. See LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 197-210 (overview of modeling CDOs).
227. See, e.g., Tomer Yahalom et al., Moody's KMV Co., Modeling Correlationof Structured
Instruments in a Portfolio Setting (2008), in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE, available
at
http://www.moodysanalytics.com/Insight/Quantitative-Research/Portfolio-Modeling.aspx
(noting that "traditional approaches to modeling economic capital, credit-VaR, for structured
instruments whose underlying collateral is comprised of structured instruments treat structured
instruments as a single-name credit instrument (i.e., a loan-equivalent)").
228. This approach is not entirely without support within the credit risk literature. See id.
(providing methodology for calibrating loan-equivalent correlation parameters to permit the use
of a single-factor structural approach to modeling portfolios of structured finance credits). Once
again, however, the point here is not to endorse this approach, but rather to imagine what a
conventional risk model in June 2007-even one that might be flawed--could have predicted had
Citigroup disclosed additional information concerning its CDO portfolio.
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then be used to calibrate the model to reflect the performance
behavior of similar credits. With respect to asset correlation, for
instance, the Van Landschoot and Jobst study cited previously also
estimated asset correlations for CDO notes using the same two-factor
model set forth in equation (2).229 Their study suggested that CDOs
had an overall asset correlation with the market (Z1 ) of just 1.8% but
had an intra-CDO correlation (Z2) of 17.6%. The third set of
simulations therefore adopted the two-factor structural model of
equation (2) using these two correlation estimates to calculate (oik. It
otherwise adopted the same assumptions as Simulation 2.
The fourth set of simulations (Simulation 4) replicated
Simulation 3 but modified the composition of the CDO portfolio to
reflect the actual notional amounts of Citigroup's positions. In
particular, the portfolio was modified so that Citigroup's AAA
positions consisted of fifty positions ranging in value from $170
million to $4.4 billion.
Figure 8 illustrates the results of all four simulations. As with
the CINB analysis, different assumptions concerning the structure of
the CDO portfolio produced notably different estimates for the tail
distribution of Citigroup's modeled trading losses. Once again, the
results highlight the critical importance of the distributional
assumption of asset values underlying a given factor model. In
Simulation 1, the model produced tail losses at 99.9% confidence of
less than $150 million, or about 0.5% of the portfolio's value. In
contrast, simply switching to an assumption in Simulation 2 that
asset values followed a t-distribution resulted in trading losses at
99.9% confidence of approximately $700 million, 1.5% of the portfolio's
initial value. Likewise, the simulations also confirm the importance of
accounting for position concentration. In Simulation 4, moving from
the assumption of a balanced, evenly distributed portfolio of CDOs to
Citigroup's actual, more concentrated portfolio increased estimated
trading losses even further. This last set of simulations yielded
estimated trading losses at 99.9% confidence of almost $900 million, or
2% of the portfolio's initial value.

229. Van Landschoot & Jobst, supra note 131, at 232.

MAKING BANKS TRANSPARENT

2012]

357

FIGURE 8: DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED TRADING LOSSES FOR
CITIGROUP'S CDO PORTFOLIO USING FOUR SETS OF SIMULATIONS
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Similar results persisted with regard to each simulation's
expected shortfall. Using 99.9% confidence, Table 5 presents the
expected shortfall for the four sets of simulations. In all four, the
expected shortfall figure was virtually double what was estimated to
be the portfolio's trading loss at 99.9% confidence.
TABLE 5: EXPECTED SHORTFALL MEASURES
Simulation
Single-Factor Model, Normal Distribution Balanced Portfolio of 439 Positions (Simulation 1)

Expected Shortfall
at 99.9% Confidence
(millions)
$124

Single-Factor Model, t-Distribution - Balanced
Portfolio of 439 Positions (Simulation 2)

$1,353

Two-Factor Model, t-Distribution - Balanced
Portfolio of 439 positions (Simulation 3)

$1,204

Two-Factor Model, t-Distribution - Citigroup's
Actual Portfolio (Simulation 4)

$1,702
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While none of these loss estimates reach the $8 billion to $10
billion of CDO-related losses Citigroup announced on November 4,
2007, they nevertheless reveal the considerable tail risk Citigroup
created by holding an unhedged portfolio of even AAA-rated trading
securities. They also highlight the danger of emphasizing the low
default risk of a portfolio of AAA-rated CDOs while ignoring their
market risk-a practice that, as noted above, was frequently employed
by firms in hopes of addressing investor concerns about their CDO
exposures. Simulation 4, for instance, produced actual defaults in less
than 0.01% of the simulations, but trading losses in excess of $200
million appeared in over 1% of the simulations.
More importantly, the foregoing summary of the Citigroup
portfolio model suggests the appropriateness of stress testing the
model's simplifying assumptions in the same fashion that was done
with CINB previously. In particular, a more accurate assessment of
how the portfolio would perform in times of economic stress would
seemingly require a more nuanced approach to the relation between
the general economy and other parameters used in the model. For
instance, credit spreads generally widen during times of economic
stress, suggesting that one-year forward rates as of June 30, 2007,
would underestimate credit spreads in a recession. Likewise, using
historic migration rates to predict migrations suffers from the fact
that the business cycle has historically experienced longer periods of
economic expansion than contraction. 230 Average historic migration
rates thus represent a biased, overly optimistic depiction of the "true"
migration rates to be expected in a period of economic contraction,
leading several commentators to recommend adjusting them according
to some model for macroeconomic variables or empirical evidence
231
when using them in credit models such as CreditMetrics.
For these reasons, Simulation 4 was rerun with several
modifications to reflect credit spreads and migration rates under
"stressed" conditions. With regard to credit spreads, in Simulation 4A,
230. See Anil Bangia et al., Ratings Migration and the Business Cycle, with Application to
Credit Portfolio Stress Testing, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 445, 467 (2002) (noting that because of the
existence after 1981 of longer periods of economic expansion than contraction, by using
"unconditional transition matrices . . . one implicitly assumes the favorable business cycle
pattern to be persistent going forward").
231. See, e.g., STEFAN TRUECK & SVETLOzAR T. RACHEV, RATING BASED MODELING OF CREDIT
RISK: THEORY AND APPLICATION OF MIGRATION MATRICES 5-6 (2009) (surveying literature and

concluding that "it seems necessary to extend transition matrix application to a conditional
perspective using additional information on the economy or even forecast transition matrices
using revealed dependencies on macroeconomic indices and interest rates").
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the credit curves used to value each CDO position were modified to
reflect the credit curves in existence in October 2002, a time in which
credit spreads widened dramatically following the bankruptcy of
Enron and WorldCom. 232 Similarly with regard to migration rates, in
Simulation 4B, the migration rates set forth in Table 4 were replaced
with the one-year migration rates for 2002.233 In contrast to Table 4,
the 2002 transition matrix reflected a greater number of rating
downgrades on account of the 2002 U.S. recession. Lastly, in
Simulation 4C, the original credit curves and the transition matrix
were both replaced with their stressed 2002 versions. In each of these
three stressed simulations, Citigroup's actual portfolio was again
simulated 100,000 times using the same portfolio assumptions as in
the original Simulation 4.
As Figure 9 reveals, each of these stressed simulations
produced considerably greater estimates of the tail risk embedded in
Citigroup's CDO portfolio. At 99.9% confidence, expected trading
losses increased from approximately $900 million in Simulation 4 to
almost $3.5 billion (or 8% of the portfolio's value) in Simulation 4C.
Estimates of expected shortfall revealed a similarly stark increase.
Whereas expected shortfall in Simulation 4 was $1.7 billion,
Simulation 4C produced an estimate for expected shortfall of nearly
$7.4 billion. As these stressed estimates indicate, Citigroup's
November 2007 announcement of CDO losses of $8 billion to $10
billion might have been improbable, but it was hardly unforeseeableat least from the perspective of credit risk modeling technology in
existence in June 2007.

232. See Scott Grannis, Credit Spread Update: Market Still Priced to Fearful Expectations,
SEEKING ALPHA (Sept. 16, 2009), http://seekingalpha.com/article/161709-credit-spread-updatemarket-still-priced-to-fearful-expectations (noting that before the Financial Crisis, corporate
spreads had most recently peaked in October 2002 following the bankruptcies of Enron and
Worldcom). As before, spread data was obtained from Bloomberg and Bondsonline. See supra
note 222.
233. STANDARD & POOR'S, supra note 132, at 44 (providing 2002 transition matrix).
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FIGURE 9: DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED TRADING LOSSES FOR
CITIGROUP'S CDO PORTFOLIO UNDER STRESSED CONDITIONS
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3. Model Assessment
As with the CINB illustration, the portfolio model used in the
prior Section has a number of limitations that potentially undermine
the reliability of its loss estimates. Most notably, the model treated
the CDO notes held by Citigroup as largely the same as corporate
bonds-an approach that, while not uncommon, has been criticized in
the credit risk literature. 234 Specifically, because senior CDO tranches
have been shown to be especially sensitive to systematic risk,235
treating CDO notes as corporate bonds may have underestimated the
portfolio's actual risk. Moreover, by limiting the analysis to Citigroup's
CDO positions, the model also ignored how its CDOs (even if they did
behave like corporate bonds) might also be correlated with other credit
instruments in Citigroup's trading book. For instance, of its $538
billion of trading assets as of June 30, 2007, Citigroup's bank
regulatory filings indicated it had approximately $21 billion of debt
234. See, e.g., LOFFLER & POSCH, supra note 79, at 204 ('In credit portfolio modeling, one
shouldn't treat CDO tranches as bonds with a standard factor sensitivity. This could lead to
severe underestimation of portfolio risk.").
235. Id. (illustrating how a mezzanine tranche of a CDO with the same default probability of
a corporate bond under normal market conditions can, under adverse market conditions, have a
higher default probability).
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securities issued by U.S. states and political subdivisions, $66 billion
of mortgage-backed securities, and $71 billion of "other debt securities
in domestic offices." 236 Each of these most likely had some positive
correlation with the value of its CDO securities. A similar criticism
could be made of the fact that the model did not incorporate the risk
associated with Citibank's off-balance liabilities, such as its
considerable indirect exposure to subprime mortgages held by several
structured investment vehicles ("SIVs").237 A more accurate analysis of
Citigroup's trading risk might therefore have incorporated these other
positions and their associated correlations with the CDO notes-a
process that would undoubtedly have increased Citigroup's estimated
losses.
Yet, while each of these issues limits the accuracy of the model
used above, neither necessarily undermines the utility of using credit
modeling technology to impose greater market discipline on financial
institutions or of encouraging better disclosure of the relevant
parameter estimates to facilitate it. For one, the fact that the model
ignored correlations between the CDOs and other trading assets was a
product of the limited public information regarding the composition of
Citigroup's trading portfolio rather than a limitation of credit
modeling per se. As a bank holding company, Citigroup has long been
required to make quarterly filings on Form Y-9C with the Federal
Reserve, which, among other things, provide an overview of the firm's
assets and liabilities. With regard to trading assets, Schedule HC-D of
the form requires bank holding companies to describe all trading
positions, but the schedule has historically provided only aggregate
notional amounts for select exposures. 2 38 Table 6, for instance,

236. See infra text accompanying notes 238-40.
237. Citigroup had historically used SlVs to formally purchase AAA-rated securities from it,
but it nevertheless remained exposed to their credit risk due to explicit and implicit guarantees
to provide liquidity support to the SIVs were they unable to obtain financing in the short-term,
asset-backed commercial paper market. When this market collapsed in winter of 2007, Citigroup
was forced to rescue its SIVs, bringing $49 billion of assets onto Citigroup's balance sheet. See
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1032-34 (2009) (describing
SIVs); Shannon D. Harrington & Elizabeth Hester, Citigroup to Consolidate Seven SIVs on
Balance Sheet, BLOOMBERG,
Dec.
13,
2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601087&sid=amwIRXuKwRR8&refer-home (describing Citigroup rescue of its SIVs).
238. In addition, Citigroup provided a similar breakdown of its trading assets in its footnotes
to its financial statements filed with the SEC. As with the Form Y-9C report, the breakdown was
limited to approximately eight categories of security types. See, e.g., Citigroup 2007 10-K Report,
supra note 192, at 142 (describing its $538 billion of trading assets).
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reproduces the trading assets listed on Citigroup's Schedule HC-D for
June 30, 2007:239
TABLE 6: TRADING ASSETS OF CITIGROUP, INC. AS OF JUNE 30, 2007
U.S. Treasury securities in domestic offices

$10,119,000

U.S. Government agency obligations in domestic offices
(excluding mortgage-backed securities)

$10,548,000

Securities issued by states and political subdivisions in
the U.S. in domestic offices
Mortgage-backed securities in domestic offices:

$21,186,000

$19,936,000

b.

Pass-through securities issued or guaranteed
by FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA
Other MBS issued or guaranteed by FNMA,

c.

FHLMC, or GNMA
All other mortgage-backed securities

$8,076,000
$38,076,000

a.

Other debt securities in domestic offices
Other trading assets in domestic offices
Other trading assets in foreign offices
Derivatives with a positive fair value:
a. In domestic offices
b. In foreign offices
Total trading assets

$71,321,000
$107,041,000
$191,300,000
$26,969,000
$33,744,000
$538,316,000

Despite these disclosures, the vagueness of these categories
makes it extraordinarily difficult to gauge even the scope of
Citigroup's exposure to credit risk in its trading book, let alone the
parameter estimates for its credit positions. At a minimum, the $38
billion of "all other mortgage-backed securities" most likely included
private-label RMBS and CMBS not subject to any form of government
guarantee, while the $71.3 billion of "other debt securities"
presumably included credit instruments such as corporate bonds,
240
loans, and (as the future would reveal) most of its CDO securities.

239. Citigroup, Inc., Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (Form
FR Y-9C) 16 (June 30, 2007) [hereinafter Citigroup 2007 Second Quarter Y-9C], available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/finldata/y9cO70630c.pdf.
240. Comparison of Citigroup's Y-9C for June 30, 2007 with that for September 30, 2007
indicates that Citigroup classified its CDO positions as "other debt securities in domestic offices."
Beginning in July 2007, Citigroup commenced the purchased of approximately $22 billion of the
senior-most notes of CDOs which had previously been funded through the commercial paper
markets. See Citigroup 2007 10-K Report, supra note 192, at 91. Despite these purchases,
Citigroup's Form Y-9C for September 30, 2007, indicated a decrease from June 30, 2007, in the
notional amount of almost all categories of trading assets except for "other debt securities,"
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Yet credit risk may have also existed within the $298 billion of "other
trading assets" in domestic and foreign offices and within the
"derivatives" category. Had more detail concerning these credit
positions been available-such as information on exposure amount by
security type, each type's average parameter estimates, and a
breakdown of security type by industry and country to estimate asset
correlations-the model used previously could have produced a more
comprehensive portfolio assessment.
Similarly, with respect to the model's failure to account for
CDOs' greater exposure to systemic risk, this shortcoming does little
to undermine the model's ability to provide market participants
greater insight into the riskiness of a firm's trading portfolio. On the
contrary, the fact that even the model used here was capable of
producing significant loss estimates for Citigroup's CDO portfolio
suggests the potential for even simple credit models to provide insight
into firms' trading portfolios on both a relative and absolute basis. For
instance, comparing the loss distribution for Citigroup's actual CDO
portfolio of fifty positions against a hypothetical balanced portfolio of
439 positions illustrates how risk models might facilitate risk
comparisons across firms. Were the hypothetical balanced portfolio to
represent the trading portfolio of another bank, utilizing this type of
analysis might highlight how name concentration within Citigroup's
portfolio represented a significantly more risky strategy than was
being pursued by other firms. For the same reasons, it might also
facilitate better pricing of financial institutions within the capital
markets while creating a powerful incentive to avoid name
concentration in the first place. Moreover, even on an absolute basis,
the fact that the model showed the potential for CDO-related losses of
between $3 billion and $7.4 billion could be used to challenge the
belief maintained by Citigroup through the fall of 2007 that "any
241
downside risk in the CDO business was minuscule."

which increased from approximately $71 billion to $107 billion. See Citigroup 2007 Second
Quarter Y-9C, supra note 239, at 16.
241. FCIC REPORT, supra note 167, at 262 ("[Charles] Prince and [Robert] Rubin [of
Citigroup] appeared to believe up until the fall of 2007 that any downside risk in the CDO
business was minuscule."); see also Bradley Keoun, Citigroup, Ex-Chief Prince, Rubin Face
Grilling on Loan Losses, BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 7, 2010, http://news.businessweek.com/article
.asp?documentkey=1377-akilajq_ugua-4ablgOd9rk2rfakf5cff2luiin
(statement
of
Thomas
Maheras, former head of Citigroup trading) ("Even in the summer and fall of 2007, 1 continued to
believe, based upon what I understood from the experts in the business, that the bank's supersenior CDO holdings were safe.").
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In this regard, perhaps the greatest benefit of facilitating
enhanced portfolio analysis by market participants is the extent to
which it could provide a concrete means to probe a firm's riskmanagement practices. Consider, for instance, the ability of market
participants to assess the consequence of Citigroup's efforts to engage
in regulatory arbitrage in 2007. As noted previously, the distinct
regulatory capital charges that applied to banking positions compared
to trading positions created significant incentives for institutions to
hold CDO securities in their trading books prior to the Financial
Crisis. 242 Understanding whether this incentive actually led firms to
hold insufficient capital against these positions, however, was made
difficult by the absence of detail regarding firms' trading portfolios.
Again, Citigroup's trading position as of June 30, 2007,
provides a vivid illustration. According to its quarterly report filed
with the SEC on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2007,
Citigroup appeared to be in full compliance with federal capital
reserve requirements. 243 With risk-adjusted assets of $1.2 trillion,
Citigroup's total regulatory capital of $131.25 billion-of which $92.4
billion was Tier 1 capital-indicated that it had a total capital ratio of

11.23% and a Tier 1 capital ratio of

7.91%.244

This made Citigroup

"well capitalized" for purposes of federal banking regulations. 24
Moreover, Citigroup's Form Y-9C filed with the Federal Reserve for
the same quarter further indicated that its regulatory capital included
$4.8 billion that Citigroup had specifically set aside to cover potential
losses in its trading book, 246 $3.7 billion of which was attributable to

242. See supratext accompanying notes 180-88.
243. As a U.S. bank holding company, Citigroup was subject to risk-based capital ratio
guidelines issued by the FRB. Citigroup, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 38 (Aug. 3, 2007)
[hereinafter Citigroup Second Quarter 10-Q]. Under these guidelines as then in effect, a bank's
capital adequacy was measured via two risk-based ratios, Tier 1 and Total Capital (Tier 1 + Tier
2 Capital). Tier 1 Capital was considered core capital and consisted of items such as equity and
noncumulative perpetual preferred stock, while Total Capital also included other items such as
subordinated debt and loan loss reserves. To be "well capitalized" under federal bank regulations
in 2007, a bank holding company must have had, among other things, a Tier 1 Capital Ratio of at
least 6% and a Total Capital Ratio of at least 10%. In computing these ratios, a bank's capital
was measured as a percentage of the bank's risk-adjusted assets (which represented a type of
weighted-average tally of a bank's assets intended to measure their credit and market risk). See
12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r)(1) (2009) (defining "well-capitalized").
244. Citigroup Second Quarter 10-Q, supra note 243, at 38.
245. Id.
246. See Citigroup 2007 Second Quarter Y-9C, supra note 239, at 32. Specifically, Citigroup's
regulatory capital disclosures indicated that it had approximately $60 billion of "market risk
equivalent assets." Id. Because regulatory capital was 8% of risk-weighted assets, this figure
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"specific risk" or the pricing risk arising from idiosyncratic changes in
a security's value including, most importantly, changes related to its
247
default risk.
Yet, whether these sums were sufficient to cover Citigroup's
trading positions was unclear given the lack of detail concerning the
composition of its trading portfolio. As Table 6 indicates, Citigroup
had approximately $538 billion of trading assets, for which little
information was provided with which to assess their riskiness and,
consequently, the adequacy of Citigroup's $4.8 billion of regulatory
capital established for its trading book. Moreover, because Citigroup
qualified to use its own internal model to establish its market risk
capital, 248 there was very little information available to the
marketplace concerning the methodology it used to determine this
amount. In contrast, the model used above might have provided the
type of concrete analysis market participants could have used to press
Citigroup on its capital assessment. Specifically, while the model
analyzed just $43 billion of its trading portfolio (approximately 8% of
its trading assets), the model indicated trading losses under 2002
stressed conditions of up to $3.5 billion at 99.9% confidence. Expected
shortfall at 99.9% confidence was nearly twice this figure, at $7.4
billion-well in excess of both the $3.7 billion of regulatory capital
Citigroup had set aside for specific risk and the $4.8 billion of
regulatory capital it set aside for the entire trading book.
A similar analysis might have also provided insight into the
reliability of Citigroup's assessment of its nonregulatory, "economic
capital" in June 2007. Because regulatory capital represents the
mandatory capital regulators require to be maintained by a financial
institution, it may not necessarily reflect the capital that a firm's
internal managers feel is necessary to maintain a firm's solvency
under adverse market conditions. 249 For this reason, a firm's risk
indicated that it had set aside capital to cover 8% of this amount. See HULL, supra note 17, at
230.
247. Citigroup 2007 Second Quarter Y-9, supra note 239, at 33 (recording $46 billion of
market risk equivalent assets attributable to specific risk); see Federal Reserve System, Agency
Information Collection Activities: Proposed Collection; Comment Request, 70 Fed. Reg. 66,426
(Nov. 2, 2005) (proposing specific risk disclosure requirement and noting that "[sipecific risk
means changes in the market value of specific positions due to factors other than broad market
movements and includes event and default risk").
248. See Citigroup 2007 10-K Report, supra note 192, at 64 (describing internal model's
compliance with FRB requirements).
249. See HULL, supra note 17, at 425 (distinguishing between regulatory capital which is
mandated by bank regulators and economic capital which is "a bank's own internal estimate of
the capital it needs for the risks it is taking").
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managers routinely calculate their own estimate of economic capital
based on an internal assessment of the firm's risk exposures and the
confidence level they feel is appropriate to ensure that the firm will
remain a going concern under adverse market conditions. 250 In the
case of Citigroup, its 2007 annual report stated that it calculated its
economic capital based on the amount of capital that would be
required to absorb potential unexpected losses resulting from
"extremely severe events over a one-year time period," which it
defined as a "potential loss at a 99.97% confidence level. '251 The high
confidence level reflected the fact that Citigroup's senior debt
currently carried a debt rating of AA, and credit rating agencies used
a 99.97% or 99.98% standard as a criterion for maintaining an AA
252
rating.
As of June 30, 2007, the result of Citigroup's economic capital
analysis was to establish total risk capital of $74.2 billion. 253 Of this
amount, Citigroup's 2007 second-quarter 10-Q indicated that $27.6
billion was allocated to its "Markets & Banking" segment which
generally housed the firm's trading and investment banking
operations as well as its commercial lending business. 25 4 As such, it
represented the division that held Citigroup's $191 billion portfolio of
held-to-maturity corporate loans, 255 its CDO exposures, and most of its
other trading assets. 2 56 Like the assessment of regulatory capital,
however, the means by which Citigroup determined that $27.6 billion
was adequate to cover losses in the segment at 99.97% confidence was
nowhere described in any of Citigroup's public filings. Indeed, even
though the Markets & Banking segment engaged in a considerable
amount of bank lending, the disclosure of the $27.6 billion of "risk
250. See JAMES LAM, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 111 (2003) ("Economic capital is ... a
function of two quantities: the organization's so-called solvency standard and its risk.").
251. Citigroup 2007 10-K Report, supra note 192, at 39. For purposes of this calculation,
drivers of "economic losses" were "risks, which can be broadly categorized as credit risk
(including cross-border risk), market risk and operational risk." Id.
252. See PHILIPPE JORIAN, VALUE AT RISK 407 (3d ed. 2007) ("Banks routinely provide their
economic capital measure using a 99.98% confidence level, which . . . corresponds to a target
credit rating of Aa.").
253. Citigroup Second Quarter 10-Q, supra note 244, at 24.
254. Id. at 18.
255. Id. at 47.
256. Of Citigroup's other five divisions, only Alternative Investments (which managed
investments primarily in private equity and hedge funds) was likely to hold a significant amount
of Citigroup's trading assets. Citigroup's annual report for 2006, for instance, indicated that the
division managed $38.5 billion of client capital and $10.7 billion of Citigroup's capital. Citigroup,
Inc. Annual Report (Form 10-K) 54 (Feb. 23, 2007).
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capital" made no distinction between the portion that represented risk
arising from its banking book compared to its trading book.
As with the analysis of Citigroup's regulatory capital, the
simple model used above might have provided useful information with
which to examine how well the segment was protected against
stressed losses at 99.97% confidence. For instance, rerunning
Simulation 4C 1,000,000 times, a loss distribution was generated to
estimate the portfolio's loss at this higher degree of confidence. Doing
so revealed a loss estimate at 99.97% confidence of approximately $8
billion, approximately one-third of the $27.6 billion of capital allocated
to the entire segment. With this figure alone, one might naturally
wonder how securities comprising just 7% of the firm's trading
portfolio could absorb one-third of the capital allocated for the division
holding this portfolio as well as $191 billion in corporate bank loans.
Indeed, the question becomes all the more puzzling given that most of
the corporate bank loans were likely to have a lower credit rating than
the CDOs, thus potentially requiring a significant portion of this $27
257
billion to cover their unexpected losses.
Of course, whether or not investors would actually engage in
this type of analysis must remain speculative. As the next Part
examines, there may indeed be a number of factors that impair the
incentives of investors to probe the risk management practices of
financial institutions prior to the onset of distress. Yet while the
aforementioned benefits may be speculative, it bears emphasizing how
little they would require in terms of additional disclosure obligations
from the perspective of individual financial institutions. As with the
prior analysis of traditional banking risk, modeling credit risk within
a trading portfolio requires just a handful of parameter estimates,
none of which would seem to implicate the disclosure of either
proprietary trading positions or customer information.
Indeed, in the case of Citigroup, constructing its CDO portfolio
was based primarily on the simple disclosure of position sizes and
257. To be sure, an analyst performing this hypothetical exercise would have to consider the
possibility that Citigroup had offset a portion of this credit risk through hedging transactions.
Such a possibility, however, does little to undermine the utility of the foregoing analysis. Rather,
by providing market participants with a metric to examine the risk associated with Citigroup's
gross credit exposures, the analysis could be used to press Citigroup management (e.g., during
analyst calls) as to why these loss estimates might overstate Citigroup's actual position (whether
due to hedging or other risk mitigation strategies). Additionally, the possibility of hedging might
also be addressed through requiring credit exposures to be disclosed on both a hedged and unhedged basis. See infra Appendix. In the case of Citigroup's actual CDO positions, no hedges
were used for the $43 billion of CDOs analyzed here. See supranote 209.
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credit ratings, with the remainder of the parameter estimates coming
from publicly available sources. Yet even the individual position sizes
need not be disclosed to the extent such disclosure might compromise
a firm's proprietary trading strategy. For instance, the same
simulated results obtained from analyzing Citigroup's actual position
data could have been roughly approximated if Citigroup had simply
disclosed that its $44 billion CDO portfolio was spread over fifty
positions. As Figure 10 reveals, rerunning Simulation 4 and
Simulation 4C using a hypothetical portfolio of fifty CDO positions
with each having an exposure amount of $880 million produced risk
measures that were remarkably similar to the measures obtained
using Citigroup's actual exposure amounts. Ultimately, the fact that
enabling the type of market discipline discussed above would require
simply a breakdown of the trading assets already disclosed in
Schedule HC-D by asset type, average rating, and average exposure
amount is perhaps the most notable insight from the Citigroup
modeling exercise.
FIGURE 10: ESTIMATED TRADING LOSSES FOR CITIGROUP'S CDO
PORTFOLIO UNDER DIFFERENT ASSUMPTIONS OF NAME
CONCENTRATION
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V. TOWARD A MODEL-SENSITIVE DISCLOSURE REGIME
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, providing market
participants with greater information about a financial institution's
solvency risk need not require the disclosure of a firm's proprietary
position information. Nor would it necessarily require a significant
overhaul of existing disclosure regulations or require market
participants to sift through a maze of different disclosures to stitch
together an understanding of a firm's credit portfolio. Despite the
significantly different problems that afflicted CINB and Citigroup, the
analysis of each firm in Part IV required only incrementally more
information regarding each institution's banking book and trading
book than current disclosure obligations require. In particular, greater
disclosure within each bank's federal banking reports concerning its
segmentation of credit risk across industries (including segmentation
by structured finance vehicle), combined with estimates within these
segments of the distribution of exposure amounts and average default
probabilities and recovery rates, were all that our hypothetical analyst
needed to build
a model that highlighted
each firm's
undercapitalization.
To be clear, the claim made here is not that market
participants would have used the particular credit models designed for
this study. As was noted at the outset, the models utilized in Part IV
represent merely basic, textbook credit portfolio models as of the time
shortly before the Financial Crisis. As such, were the core set of
parameter estimates explored in Part III disclosed by banks, real-life
credit analysts would no doubt use more modern, sophisticated
approaches to analyze banks' credit portfolios. 25 8 In the absence of
such disclosures, however, one can only speculate as to the types of
models that would be used and their overall effectiveness, thus
motivating the use of the thought experiment in Part IV. That it relied
on such basic credit models was simply meant to illustrate how even a
simple model prior to the Financial Crisis (and one that in hindsight

258. Presumably, these would include updated, off-the-rack approaches such as JP Morgan's
CreditMetrics, McKinsey's CreditPortfolioView, or KMV's Portfolio Manager, as well as
proprietary models designed by particular analysts. See CAOUETTrE ET AL., supranote 23, at 23151 (describing different portfolio approaches); Bartlett, supra note 22, at 42-48 (describing
Pershing Square's model used for analyzing monoline insurance companies).
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made unduly optimistic assumptions 2 9) could have still been used to
highlight some of the risks CINB and Citigroup were takingprovided the banks had disclosed even some of the core set of
parameter estimates at the heart of credit analysis.
Nor does this Article intend to suggest that a model-sensitive
disclosure regime would necessarily be restricted to the core set of risk
parameters used in Part IV. Portfolio analysis has evolved
significantly over recent years and will no doubt continue to do so,
making the analysis provided above simply a snapshot of the basic
structure of credit risk analysis as it stands today. The foregoing
analysis was also limited to each bank's on-balance-sheet, unhedged,
gross exposures. 260 While these exposures played a critical role in the
turmoil at CINB and Citigroup, real-life credit models would naturally
reflect a more sophisticated account of the full scope of a firm's credit
exposure, including the extent to which hedges affect the risk of these
gross exposures along with the hedges' basis risk. 261 A disclosure
regime that was truly responsive to credit modeling technology might
thus entail disclosures concerning a more expansive, evolving set of
parameters than the four estimates that are currently at the heart of
credit risk analysis.
Rather, the general argument advanced here is that the same
sensitivity to state-of-the-art credit analysis that informs banks' own
risk management processes should also inform the structure of
mandatory bank disclosures. Indeed, sensitivity to developments in
credit risk analysis is already a well-established practice when it
comes to setting capital requirements both in the United States and
abroad. It was, after all, an appreciation of the evolution of credit risk
analysis that initially prompted regulators to permit banks to set their
regulatory capital using their own internal models in Pillar I of the

259. See supra text accompanying notes 234-35. Additionally, the model used to analyze
Citigroup's CDO portfolio relied on a transition matrix for bonds that significantly
underestimated the true, downward migration rate of the highly rated bonds issued by CDOs in
2008. See Saunders & Allen, supra note 90, at 29-31 (discussing failure of rating agencies to
account for the poor quality of collateral underlying subprime mortgage pools prior to the
Financial Crisis).
260. For instance, as noted previously, the model used for Citigroup did not account for the
bank's indirect exposure to subprime-backed CDOs held in June 2007 in one of several offbalance-sheet STVs. See supra text accompanying note 237.
261. See HULL, supra note 17, at 313-19 (describing methodology for accounting for credit
hedging).
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Basel II Capital Accords.2 62 As this Article has demonstrated,
however, there is no reason why the lessons of credit risk management
should be so limited. Notwithstanding the simplicity of the CINB and
Citigroup models, each provides an intriguing illustration of how
integrating bank disclosure policy with even basic credit risk modeling
might provide significant new information to the marketplace while
avoiding the constraints that have traditionally hamstrung bank
disclosures. As such, credit risk modeling would seem especially
pertinent to designing not only banks' Pillar I capital requirements
but also their Pillar III disclosure obligations.
What exactly would a model-sensitive disclosure regime
require? Because of the evolving nature of credit risk analysis, the
exact form of such a regime will necessarily involve some degree of
fluidity. As credit models change, the informational architecture for
assessing portfolio risk should also be expected to change, and with it,
the assessment of what disclosures would be most useful for assessing
the credit risk within a financial institution. But at a minimum, it is
clear any such disclosures would depart notably from the current U.S.
reporting system which, in many ways, has historically functioned as
if the considerable world of credit risk analysis is limited to banks'
internal risk management. Despite the central role of correlation and
concentration risk in credit analysis, for instance, existing disclosures
mandated by federal banking regulations make it extraordinarily
difficult to discern how even these two critical issues might affect a
banking institution's risk profile. As noted in Part IV, the disclosures
regarding a bank's trading assets set forth in Schedule HC-D of Form
Y-9C provide virtually no information concerning the extent to which
the trading book is even exposed to credit risk, let alone how it might
be affected by name or sector concentration. With respect to a bank's
traditional loan portfolio, the disclosures mandated in areas such as
Schedule HC-C of Form Y-9C are slightly more useful insofar that
263
they provide a partial breakdown of a bank's loan book by loan type,
262. See supra text accompanying note 182 (describing market risk capital); see also
MICHAEL K. ONG, INTERNAL CREDIT RISK MODELS: CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND PERFORMANCE

MEASUREMENT 20 (1999) (quoting Alan Greenspan: 'These internal capital allocation models
have much to teach the supervisor, and are critical to understanding the possible misallocative
effects of [an] inappropriate capital rule.").
263. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF
CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR BANK HOLDING COMPANIES: REPORTING FORM FR Y-

9C, at HC-C-2 to -23 (Mar. 2007), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms
/FRY-9C20101231_i.pdf (describing loan categories to which loans held for investment must be
assigned).
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but similarly lack useful details concerning whether these loan types
are exposed to sector, name, or regional concentrations. 264 For
example, disclosures concerning a bank's commercial and industrial
loans are limited to the aggregate dollar-value of loans made "[t]o U.S.
addressees" and those made "to non-U.S. addressees." 265 Most other
itemized loan categories provide even less information, listing simply
the dollar-value of loans "secured by 1-4 family residential properties"
266
or "credit card loans."
In contrast, a disclosure regime that was more sensitive to
credit risk analysis would presumably begin by acknowledging the
central role of concentration and correlation in understanding the
portfolio risks posed in an institution's banking and trading books.
Again, the precise format would ideally involve an ongoing
consideration of the technology banks and analysts use to measure
and monitor credit risk, but the basic principles of credit analysis
outlined previously suggest a number of ways in which current
disclosure policy could be enhanced. Outlined in the Appendix, for
instance, is but one way in which existing quarterly bank reports
could be modified to enhance the disclosure of credit exposures in an
institution's banking and trading books. By breaking down net and
gross exposures by both region and industry as well as by providing
information on name concentration, the disclosures described in the
Appendix would provide a starting point for the analysis of a
portfolio's correlation structure and concentration risk in much the
same fashion that was done for CINB and Citigroup in Part IV. Using
this approach would also maximize the ability of market participants
to use the considerable third-party research on credit risk that
commonly analyzes credit risk using the same categories set forth in
structured finance
(e.g., by industry and
the Appendix
267 Standardizing the classification of credit risk by itself
classification).
may also facilitate the production of additional third-party research on
how the primary parameters of credit risk operate within these
categories. By using additional arrays within this structure, banks
could further provide their own internal estimates of credit

264. Id.
265. Id. at HC-C-10.
266. Id. at HC-C-4, HC-C-12.
267. See, e.g., Van Landschoot & Jobst, supra note 131, at 235 (analyzing asset correlation
using the same industry classifications as used in the Appendix).
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parameters such as average default probability, loss given default,
268
and asset correlation.
Focusing on regional, industrial, and name concentrations
might also address one other limitation of prevailing disclosures: the
issue of complexity. As noted previously, one of the primary challenges
facing bank disclosure policy has been the fact that requiring a
disaggregated presentation of a bank's assets could entail an
extraordinarily complex and costly procedure for both banks and
investors. As Citigroup argued in its defense to the allegation that it
had failed to disclose its CDO exposures prior to November 2007, "the
type of line item disclosure suggested by plaintiffs would be overly
burdensome and time consuming to prepare, and the resulting
disclosure would be too granular to be meaningful."' 269 Scholars and
investors, too, have frequently articulated the concern that the
amount of information required to assess a bank's risk profile may be
too complicated for investors to process quickly in a meaningful way,
particularly with respect to a bank's exposure to complex credit
27 0
derivatives.
268. To facilitate voluntary disclosure of these additional estimates, the regime could also
make clear that disclosures concerning a portfolio's parameter estimates constitute forwardlooking statements under section 21E of the Exchange Act. Such an approach would insulate
potentially inaccurate estimates from private civil liability under federal securities laws yet still
render them subject to public antifraud enforcement. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i), 78u5(c)(1)(A)(i) (providing a safe harbor from private civil 10b-5 liability for forward-looking
statements "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements'). As Amanda Rose has noted,
private civil antifraud liability under U.S. securities laws may have considerable chilling effects
on firms' disclosure of forward-looking information (such as a prediction relating to default
probabilities) given the inability to ensure its accuracy and the considerable liability that will
attach if a tribunal, after the fact, views a mistaken prediction as having been made with
fraudulent intent. See Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2184 (2010). Limiting the authority to
police deceitful disclosure of a portfolio's parameter estimates to a financial institution's primary
regulator under section 12(i) of the Exchange Act would diminish the incentive of firms to make
inaccurate estimates while avoiding the chilling effect of full civil liability. Ideally, such an
approach would also be coupled with incentivizing regulators to balance both the social costs of
permitting fraudulent parameter estimates and the chilling effects of mistakenly finding fraud
where none exists. See id. at 2192-98 (articulating theory of the "well-incentivized" antifraud
enforcer).
269. See Defendants' Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 26 n.21, In re Citigroup Inc. Sec. Litig., 753 F.
Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 07 Civ. 9901), 2009 WL 773441.
270. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 19 (arguing that many legitimate transactions in which
securities are issued are "so complex that less than a critical mass of investors can understand
them in a reasonable time period [and to that extent] the market will not reach a fully informed
price equilibrium, and hence will not be efficient"); see also Letter from Warren Buffett,
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Without diminishing the significance of this challenge, one of
the more notable features of both the CINB and Citigroup analyses in
Part IV was the remarkably straightforward way in which each
institution's credit woes were manifested. Despite the vast difference
between the two institutions, each ultimately suffered from poorly
managed, unhedged credit concentrations that could have been
highlighted with a disclosure regime outlined in the Appendix. To be
sure, even such disclosures would understate the actual extent to
which each firm was exposed to credit risk. For instance, simply
disclosing the aggregate amount of Citigroup's holdings of CDOs,
RMBS, and other asset-backed securities would have concealed the
extent to which Citigroup was exposed to the subprime housing
market. 271 Yet doing so would have nevertheless highlighted the fact
that Citigroup held close to $50 billion of unhedged CDOs across just
fifty positions. Moreover, by standardizing this disclosure across
institutions, such information might have also helped make more
salient the significant, largely illiquid CDO concentrations that many
banks began building in their trading books throughout 2006 and
2007.272

In the process, it may have even provided a deterrent for

doing so in the first place.
Having chosen to focus on two historical banking crises, this
Article nevertheless raises two potential objections worth addressing
in closing. The first relates to the oft-mentioned concern that any
regulatory proposal aimed at addressing past crises potentially risks
"fighting the last war" rather than anticipating the new and different
crises of the future. 273 The second, somewhat conflicting one relates to
the traditional concern that if market participants failed to detect
these significant banking crises in the past, what confidence can we
Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway 17
(Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.comfletters/20081tr.pdf ("Improved
'transparency'-a favorite remedy of politicians, commentators and financial regulators for
averting future train wrecks-won't cure the problems that derivatives pose. I know of no
reporting mechanism that would come close to describing and measuring the risks in a huge and
complex portfolio of derivatives .... When I read the pages of 'disclosure' in 10-Ks of companies
that are entangled with these instruments, all I end up knowing is that I don't know what is
going on in their portfolios (and then I reach for some aspirin).").
271. See supra text accompanying note 237 (describing Citigroup SIVs).
272. See supra text accompanying notes 179-88 (describing buildup of CDOs within financial
institutions' trading books).
273. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 462 (2011) ("As a
general matter, regulators tend to regulate to prevent the last crisis, much as generals often
train to fight the last war. Unfortunately, financial crises tend to be perennial but always appear
in a new guise.").
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have that they will use incrementally improved disclosures to behave
differently in the future?
With respect to the first consideration, the history of banking
crises has unfortunately demonstrated the very real problems that can
arise when bank regulations focus on "fighting the last war." Indeed,
bank regulations implemented after the collapse of CINB provide a
telling illustration. Recognizing the risk that loan concentrations can
pose for a bank, both U.S. and international banking regulators
imposed regulations during the late 1980s designed to limit credit
concentrations within a loan portfolio.2 7 4 It was also during this time
period that bank regulators significantly revised capital requirements
275
for credit risk, as reflected in the original 1988 Basel Accords.
Neither set of reforms, however, anticipated the extent to which
concentrations of credit risk could migrate from the banking book to
the trading book where, as noted previously, the market risk capital
requirements permitted banks to reduce the capital they were
required to hold for what was simply a new manifestation of credit
risk. More recently, reforms such as the Basel Committee's
277
"incremental risk charge" 276 as well as Dodd-Frank's Volcker Rule
aim to prevent a repeat of such regulatory arbitrage between banking
and trading books, but for many, these attempts to prevent a

274. See, e.g., Ellen W. Smith, New Controls on Global Debt: The International Lending
Supervision Act of 1983, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 425, 433-46 (1984) (describing concentration
limits imposed on banking lending in the wake of CINB's collapse).
275. Cf. Patricia A. McCoy, Musings on the Seeming Inevitability of Global Convergence in
Banking Law, 7 CONN. INS. L.J. 433, 444 (2001) (noting how the original Basel capital accords
were developed in response to international banking scandals, including among them, the failure
of CINB).
276. The incremental risk charge (or IRC) for the trading book was originally proposed by
the Basel Committee in 2005 due to concerns that banks were reducing their capital
requirements by shifting their exposures from the banking book to the trading book in the
manner described at text accompanying notes 179-88. See HULL, supra note 17, at 242. In
general the IRC will require banks to hold additional capital against their trading book assets to
capture both default and migration risk for debt securities within it. For an overview of the IRC
calculation, see STANDARD & POOR'S, PROPOSED BASEL II RULES WOULD REQUIRE BANKS TO
HOLD MORE CAPITAL AGAINST TRADING RISK 2-3
(Feb. 24, 2009), available at

http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/Basel-IIBanksCapital 03_30_09.pdf.
277. The so-called "Volcker Rule," implemented in section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
prohibits banking entities from engaging in certain forms of proprietary trading, which might

significantly reduce the size of banking institutions' trading books. Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376-2223 (2010).
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recurrence of the Financial Crisis simply provide an incentive for
278
banks to find new means to hold and trade credit risk.
In contrast, one of the benefits of making bank disclosures
sensitive to credit risk modeling is that it should help reduce the
ability of banks to reinvent credit risk in new and opaque ways. As
noted above, despite the significant differences between the CINB and
Citigroup crises, the fundamental challenge was remarkably similar
in that both institutions failed to manage credit risk concentrations.
What distinguished the two experiences from a risk management
perspective was that the locus of these credit concentrations had
migrated from the banking book to the trading book-a migration that
was actually induced by regulatory attempts to capture credit risk. 279
Yet, while an institution's exposure to credit risk might not be fully
reflected in its banking book, bank risk managers knew it still existed
in the trading book. Indeed, models such as CreditMetrics were
designed so that banks could measure and manage that risk. As
capital markets continue to develop new forms of credit risk
instruments, there is no reason to expect the market for credit risk
models to behave any differently. Focusing on how the banking
industry itself continues to measure and manage credit risk can thus
help ensure that market participants are also capable of tracking
credit risk presence through other yet-to-be-determined domains of a
bank's operations.
The more difficult question to answer is gauging the extent to
which market participants will actually undertake the type of analysis
illustrated in Part IV. As has frequently been noted, both federal
deposit insurance as well as the implicit (and, as demonstrated in
2008, explicit) government guarantees afforded large banking
institutions may very well diminish the incentives of a bank's

278. See, e.g., Simone Varotto, Stress Testing Credit Risk: The Great Depression Scenario,
(ICMA
Centre
Discussion
Papers
in Finance DP2010-03,
2010),
available at
http://www.icmacentre.ac.uk/files/dp20lOO3.pdf
(finding that although the IRC may be
considerable, the capital needed to absorb market risk related to trading losses in stressed
scenarios can be more than twenty times larger than the IRC requires); Raj Date, Through the
Looking Glass (Steagall): Banks, Broker Dealers, and the Volcker Rule (Jan. 27, 2010), available
at http://www.cambridgewinter.org/Cambridge_Winter/Archives/Entries
2010/1/27_THROUGHTH E_LOOKINGGLASS_(STEAGALL)_files/looking/o2Oglass%20steagal
l%20012710l.pdf (criticizing limits to the Volcker Rule as implemented in the Dodd-Frank Act);
The Volcker Rule, Merkley-Levin, and Loopholes (Gory Details Edition), ECONOMICS OF
CONTEMPT, Nov. 6, 2010, http://economicsofcontempt.blogspot.com/2010/11/volcker-rule-merkley.

levin-and.html (same).
279. See supra text accompanying note 274.
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depositors and investors to monitor its risk profile. 280 Moreover, for
reasons discussed previously, a bank's equity investors may also have
strong incentives for a banking institution to hold inadequate capital
to support its risk-taking activities. 28 1 The potential for such
incentives among a firm's investors naturally poses a challenge for
any attempt to facilitate enhanced market discipline of financial
institutions.
Yet, despite this possibility, banking institutions are hardly
immune from market discipline. A significant body of empirical
research, for instance, has documented that market participants do in
fact exact an institution-specific risk premium from banking
organizations. 28 2 Perhaps because they are less likely to benefit from
the government's implicit guarantee, a bank's junior creditors appear
to be especially active in monitoring banks. 28 3 And of course, when
particular industries or regions experience a significant downturn,
there is no shortage of analysts, such as Matt King or hedge funds,
who exert downward pricing pressure on institutions believed to be
exposed to distressed credits. 28 4 With regard to understanding the
incentives of a bank's investors, the more accurate question is thus not
whether markets can discipline banks at all, but why they do not seem
to obtain more granular banking disclosures in nondistress settings.
Stated somewhat differently, if investors truly valued additional bank
disclosures in nondistress settings, why wouldn't banks already be
providing them voluntarily?
While it is difficult to know for sure, there are good reasons to
believe that the lack of more granular information in nondistress
settings may stem from a basic principal-agent challenge within
280. See, e.g., Levitin, supra note 273, at 490 ("[Ilf either or both creditors and shareholders
of such a [Too-Big-To-Fail] institution believe they will be made whole in a bailout-or not bear
all the losses-they will have a reduced incentive to monitor the ... institution's risk-taking.").
281. See supra Part II.
282. See generally Mark J. Flannery & Stanislava Nikolova, Market Discipline of U.S.
Financial Firms: Recent Evidence and Research Issues, in MARKET DISCIPLINE ACROSS
COUNTRIES AND INDUSTRIES 87 (Claudio Borio et al. eds., 2004) (summarizing literature).
283. See, e.g., id. (summarizing research on market discipline by subordinated debt holders);
Isabelle Distinguin & Clovis Rugemintwari, The Role of Market Discipline on Bank Capital
Buffer: Evidence from a Sample of European Banks (Jan. 2011) (unpublished manuscript),
availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1739690 (finding that junior and
senior debt holders exert pressure on commercial banks to hold additional capital, with junior
creditors requiring additional capital for banks that pursue non-traditional lending activities).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 1-6 (discussing Citigroup's analysts in 2007); see
also Bartlett, supra note 22, at 42-48 (discussing use by Pershing Square Capital of disclosures
made by monoline insurers in early 2008).
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financial institutions that is particularly acute given the history of
federal banking policy discussed in Part II. As is well known, in a
world where contracts are incompletely specified, any principal-agent
relationship will necessarily entail some risk that an agent will use
her discretion in a fashion that may adversely affect the welfare of the
principal. 2 5 For this reason, in well-functioning markets, investors
(acting as principals) should ordinarily be expected to demand
contract covenants from managers (acting as their agents) to protect
against this risk, of which enhanced disclosure is but one type of
protective mechanism. 2 6 Alternative methods of policing agency risks
include securing some form of a performance bond from the agent or
simply discounting the price at which the principal is willing to enter
28 7
into the relationship.
As applied to a bank's managers and its investors, this basic
framework admits a straightforward explanation as for why investors
may value more granular portfolio information but may not receive it
until exposures within a bank become distressed. While the type of
disclosures suggested in the Appendix does not require revelation of a
bank's proprietary position information, the disclosures nevertheless
impose some degree of costs on bank managers. These costs might
include, for instance, the cost to the banking institution of revealing
incrementally more information concerning its investment strategies
as well as costs to bank managers of highlighting potential

285. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (noting that
"agency costs arise in any situation involving cooperative effort ... by two or more people even
though there is no clear-cut principal-agent relationship"). To be clear, the principal-agent
relationship at issue here is derived from principal-agent economics, rather than from the law of
principal-agent. See Kenneth Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE
STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37, 44 (1985) (describing an agency relationship as one in which "[tihe
action [of the agent] affects the economic welfare of both the agent and another person, the
principal").
286. See generally Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False
Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 48-51 (2006) (summarizing literature
applying agency theory to explain the capital structure of business organizations).
287. See id. at 50; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 285, at 309 (describing the solution to
agency problems as consisting of monitoring, bonding, or pricing the agency costs). A similar
dynamic is at work in George Akerlof's classic model of a market-for-lemons: if buyers cannot
adequately observe the quality of products, they will demand a discount to bear the risk of
quality uncertainty, driving good quality products from the marketplace until a market can no
longer function. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970) (developing the "market for lemons"
theory). For an explanation for why discounting is unlikely to create a market for lemons in the
context of bank investors, see infra note 288.
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mismanagement of credit risk. For this reason, a bank's managers
may very well choose to suffer a pricing discount within the capital
markets rather than disclose additional portfolio information that
investors could use to more precisely calibrate the risk of its credit
portfolio. This might be especially true in light of federal banking
policy that has historically privileged prudential regulation and
oversight of banks at the expense of bank transparency. 28 8 In contrast,
if the bank's loan portfolio later becomes distressed, bank managers
may then have strong incentives to avoid this pricing discount by
providing more information concerning the distressed sectors. The
reason stems from the fact that the pricing discount imposed by
capital markets will often demonstrate nonlinearity upon credit
289
deterioration within a loan portfolio.
To see how this could occur, consider a bank holding a simple
two-loan portfolio as illustrated in Figure 11a. The bank, of course,
knows that the true composition of its $1,000 loan portfolio is evenly
split between two companies that are exposed to Sector A and Sector
B, respectively. The bank's managers, however, may be reluctant to
disclose this information to the public so long as the pricing discount
imposed by the capital markets is less than the value the managers
place on confidentiality. In particular, assuming the bank discloses
only its general exposure to Sector A and Sector B, rational investors
might penalize the bank for not disclosing more granular information
288. More specifically, federal banking policy might incentivize bank managers to opt for a
pricing discount over more granular disclosures for two reasons. First, as discussed previously,
the historically inconsistent approach to bank disclosure policy might make banks and investors
uncertain of what may and may not be voluntarily disclosed by banks, thus adding regulatory
compliance risk to the cost of disclosure from the perspective of bank managers. Second, bank
regulators represent the type of "counteracting institution" in Akerlofs model for a market for
lemons that allows a market to function notwithstanding the inability of investors to distinguish
high quality banks from low quality banks. Cf. Marc T. Law, The Origins of State Pure Food
Regulation, 63 J. ECON. HIST. 1103, 1119-28 (2003) (arguing that state regulation of food quality
permitted food markets to function in the late 1880s notwithstanding the inability of consumers
to distinguish between producers who engaged in food adulteration from those who did not). For
similar reasons, the fact that bank regulators monitor the safety and soundness of financial
institutions may be perceived to diminish the risks posed by bank opacity and, as a result, the
pricing discount markets place on banks that fail to disclose more granular information.
289. Additionally, federal banking disclosure policy has generally encouraged banks to
disclose problems within their credit portfolios to the extent they have increased loan loss
reserves or are likely to do so. See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, Revision of
Industry Guide Disclosures for Bank Holding Companies, 48 Fed. Reg. 37,609 (1983) (requiring
bank holding companies to provide in their quarterly SEC filings a description of "nonaccrual,
past due and restructured loans" as well as "potential problem loans"). Such policies likely
diminish a bank's concern about whether disclosure of its exposure to problematic loans or
sectors is consistent with federal banking regulations.
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by assuming the bank was concentrated in one of the two sectors. The
second half of Figure 11a, for instance, indicates what would happen if
investors assumed the bank was exposed 75% to one of the sectors but
otherwise shared the bank's estimate of each sector's risk parameters.
Based on the assumptions set forth in Figure 1la, this would result in
an identical calculation of expected loss, but it would produce a 99.9%
credit VaR that was approximately 11% higher than the bank's
calculation. Assuming the market expects the bank to withstand
losses at 99.9% confidence, the bank might therefore choose to hold
slightly more capital than its internal models suggest is necessary
rather than disclose more information concerning the composition of
its loan portfolio.
FIGURE 11A: ACTUAL PORTFOLIO VS. MARKET ASSUMPTIONS
UNDER NORMAL MARKET CONDITIONS
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Yet this solution might suddenly appear suboptimal for the
bank's managers to the extent Sector A experiences a sudden
deterioration in credit quality. If, for instance, the default probability
for Sector A jumped from 5% to 10% as reflected in Figure 11b, the
bank's internal estimate of expected loss would increase to $50 (an
increase of 100%), while its 99.9% credit VaR would increase 66% to
$436. At the same time, market participants-still lacking
information concerning the bank's actual exposure to Sector A-might
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now "assume the worse" 290 and conclude that the bank's portfolio is
concentrated in Sector A rather than Sector B. Under the same
assumption that its portfolio has a 75% exposure to this sector, the
market's estimate for expected loss would now increase to $62.50 (25%
greater than the bank's) while 99.9% credit VaR would increase to
$591 (35% greater than the bank's). 29 1 Faced with a widening gulf
between the market's estimate of the bank's risk and the bank's
internal estimate, the bank's managers might now choose to provide
more granular details concerning its exposure to Sector A in hopes of
diminishing the gulf.
FIGURE llB: ACTUAL PORTFOLIO VS. MARKET ASSUMPTIONS
UNDER STRESSED MARKET CONDITIONS
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To be sure, real-life markets rarely permit such a precise
estimate of the pricing discount markets demand for bank opacity.
Nonetheless, the example provides a simple illustration of how
investors might value more granular portfolio information under
general market conditions but still be unable to obtain it from a bank.
It also explains why banks generally become so much more willing to
make these disclosures once adverse market conditions cause
290. The quotation refers to the oft-noted tendency of participants in the capital markets to
make adverse assumptions about banks' exposure to suddenly distressed sectors (or countries) in
the absence of additional information. See infra text accompanying note 292.
291. More pessimistic assumptions concerning the bank's concentration to Sector A would
simply widen this wedge: an assumption of 100% concentration to Sector A, for instance, would
yield an expected loss of $75 and a 99.9% credit VaR of $770.
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investors to make assumptions that can dramatically increase the cost
of opacity. As one analyst remarked after the Financial Crisis, "You
had no basis on which to make an assumption, so you made the worst
assumption possible." 292 To the extent market participants behave in
this fashion, using credit models to inform bank disclosures might
therefore provide a means to convey valuable portfolio information to
the market in advance of adverse market conditions while permitting
banks to preserve much of the value that they place on protecting
proprietary investment information.
In the end, of course, determining the value market
participants might place on the additional disclosures proposed in this
Article is rife with uncertainty. Yet so long as bank regulatory policy
remains committed to enhancing market discipline, such uncertainty
can hardly be a justification for the current gulf that exists between
the information required for modern credit risk analysis and the
information currently required to be disclosed by banking institutions.
Valued by banks themselves for purposes of managing their credit risk
exposure-a value reflected in both the large literature on credit risk
analysis as well as a robust market for credit risk modeling
technology-modern credit risk analysis currently provides a key
analytical framework for understanding a banking institution's risk
profile. For any regime dedicated to enhancing market oversight of
financial institutions, this fact alone would seem reason enough to
consider how bank disclosure policy might better enable market
participants to similarly leverage the framework's analytical power.
Moreover, doing so in a manner that embraces the need for some
degree of experimentalism in bank disclosure policy would also permit
a more precise understanding of how market participants would

actually utilize

it.293

VI. CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding their considerable disclosure obligations,
banking institutions represent an especially opaque form of business
organization. Motivated by the conflicting objectives of making banks
more transparent while protecting their proprietary investment
strategies, disclosure policies in both the United States and abroad
292. Bradley Keoun, Trading Eludes Dodd-Frankas Investors See Black Box, BLOOMBERG,
Sept. 12, 2010, available at http://www.bloomberg.comlnews/2010-09-12/trading-eludes.dodd.

frank-as-no-investors-see-inside-black-box.html (statement of analyst Richard Bove).
293. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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have generally resulted in costly and ineffective disclosure regimes
that compromise the ability of market participants to engage in
effective market discipline while potentially aggravating systemic
risk.
By turning to credit risk modeling technology, this Article has
argued that using credit models to inform bank disclosure policy
provides a promising means by which to significantly enhance bank
transparency while avoiding the need for banks to disclose sensitive
position-level information. Moreover, as it would require only
incremental changes to existing disclosure obligations, reforming
disclosure policies in this fashion also represents a relatively simple
and prompt way with which bank regulators could reduce the type of
uncertainty concerning a bank's exposure to credit risk that has all too
frequently destabilized the financial sector. In the process, by enabling
market participants to probe an institution's risk management with
their own credit models, the disclosures advocated here may also
discourage in the first instance the common credit risk management
errors that have been at the heart of some of this country's most
significant banking crises.
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VII.

APPENDIX

The following table illustrates a potential disclosure format
banks might use to provide additional information concerning the
parameter estimates needed to model the credit risk of their banking
and trading books. The table shows, for instance, how a bank could
disclose its corporate-loan and structured-finance positions for each
book. For corporate loans, industry sectors were obtained by using the
same industry sectors Standard & Poor's uses in its annual reports on
corporate default and migration rates, although alternative sector
divisions could be adopted (e.g., by two-letter SIC code). Structured
finance positions were divided by asset type and further divided by
current rating to provide information regarding tranche seniority. The
format for structured finance positions was based largely on the
format used by the Federal Reserve to disclose its holdings of the
294
structured finance positions acquired from AIG.
The table would also require disclosure by geographic region,
which could represent either nations, regions, or states. For reasons
discussed in the text, the table below focuses on disclosing only a
bank's name and sector concentrations, in which case additional
parameter estimates could be estimated from third-party sources that
use a similar sector-by-sector framework to analyze parameters such
as default probability, loss given default, and asset correlation. By
using additional columns, banks could also be required to disclose
their internal estimates for these other parameters by adding twodimensional arrays. For instance, columns 1* and 2* could provide the
bank's estimate of the mean and standard deviation for the default
probability for each sector within Region/Country A. To account for
hedges, the table could be presented on both a gross and net-of-hedges
basis.

294. See Maiden Lane III, Quarterly Report (June
http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/maidenlane/pdf/iLIIIQ2-2010.pdf.

30,

2010),

available at
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Region/Country A
Total
Notional
Exposure:
Corporate
Aerospace / automotive /
capital goods / metal
Consumer / Service
Sector
Energy and Natural
Resources
Financial Institutions
Forest and building
products / homebuilders
Health Care / Chemicals
High Technology /
Computers / Office
Equipment
Insurance
Leisure time / media
Real Estate
Telecommunications
Transportation
Utility
Structured Finance
RMBS
AAA
AA+ to AAA+ to ABBB+ to BBB

BB+ and lower
Total:
CMBS
AAA
AA+ to AAA+ to ABBB+ to BBB
BB+ and lower
Total:

Number Exposure Amount Per Position
Standard
of
Deviation
Average
Positions

1*

2*
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Region/Country A
Total
Notional

Exposure:
ABS CDO
AAA
AA+ to AAA+ to ABBB+ to BBB
BB+ and lower
Total:
Other CDO
AAA
AA+ to AAA+ to ABBB+ to BBB
BB+ and lower
Total:
Other ABS
AAA
AA+ to AAA+ to ABBB+ toBBB
BB+ and lower
Total:

Number Exposure Amount Per Position
of
Standard
Positions
Average
Deviation

1*

2*

